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I. INTRODUCTION 
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or 
without trial is the carefully limited exception.1 
* Professor of Law, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. J.D., Howard 
University School of Law; B.A., University of Washington. Many thanks to Jesse Flickenger, Class 
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In 2016, a total of 65% of [United States jail] inmates were awaiting 
court action on a current charge. . .2 
Bail administration in the United States was once characterized by a 
high degree of uniformity among jurisdictions. Today, bail administration 
is perhaps one of the most diverse criminal court procedures among states. 
Most original state constitutions contained two bail guarantees: the first, 
a prohibition against excessive bail, like that found in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; the second, a guarantee that 
“all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,” except those charged 
with specific types of offenses. Historically, the exclusive function of bail 
was to secure the accused’s presence at trial, and an accused could secure 
conditional release pending trial if a third party—his surety—promised to 
take responsibility for producing the defendant for trial, or forfeit money 
or property if he didn’t. This type of conditional release—bail on 
“sufficient sureties”—was available to anyone charged with an offense 
not specifically designated as nonbailable. Nonbailable offenses in United 
States bail law were commonly limited to capital offenses. This meant 
most offenses were bailable. The right to be “bailable by sufficient 
sureties” for noncapital offenses is categorical—if an accused is charged 
with a bailable offense, the trial court must set bail, and it must release the 
accused if he meets bail. The right allows for no exceptions; an accused 
charged with a bailable offense cannot, for example, be detained pretrial 
without bail to prevent his flight or to protect the community. Today most 
states do not recognize a categorical right to bail by sufficient sureties for 
noncapital offenses. 
Federal bail law developed on a separate track from state law. Unlike 
the original constitutions of most states, the United States Constitution 
contains no bailability provision. And the Supreme Court has rejected the 
notion that the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause contains an 
implicit right to bail—the fact that excessive bail is prohibited, it has held, 
says nothing about whether there is a federal constitutional right to bail in 
the first place. Consequently, bailability in federal court is governed 
entirely by statute: initially by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and, since the 
mid-1960s, by the federal Bail Reform Act. Congress enacted the Bail 
of 2018, for all his diligence and hard work as my research assistant during the early research phase 
of this project. 
1. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
2. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES IN 2016 SUMMARY (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWM3-FWP3]. 
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Reform Act in 1966 and amended it in 1984. The 1966 Act was the 
product of a national bail reform conversation that highlighted the unfair 
impacts of money-bail on the indigent defendant. To address this concern, 
the 1966 Act heavily disfavored the use of money-bail and made no-
money-bail the default condition of release in federal court. Congress 
amended the Bail Reform Act in 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act. The 1984 Act recognized an additional basis for pretrial 
detention in federal court, apart from securing the defendant’s presence at 
future proceedings—protecting public safety (often referred to as 
“preventive detention”). Most states followed suit and abrogated their 
constitutional right to bail by sufficient sureties for noncapital offenses to 
allow for risk-based pretrial detention without bail for some noncapital 
offenses. Bail administration in these states generally has two primary 
features. One, preventive pretrial detention without bail is authorized for 
noncapital offenses based on an individualized showing that a defendant 
presents a risk of flight or a risk to the community. And two, money-bail 
is a release condition of last resort. 
Money-bail, thus, has become a disfavored condition of release in 
federal court and in states with reformed bail administrations. But it 
continues to play two important functions in states that retain an absolute 
right to bail for noncapital offenses. First, in those states, the only basis 
for detaining an accused charged with a bailable offense pretrial is the 
failure to meet bail. Therefore, the only avenue available for detaining 
dangerous, yet bailable, defendants pretrial in those states is to set bail in 
an amount they cannot pay. This tactic, obviously, is completely 
ineffective in detaining wealthy defendants; but it works in most cases 
since most defendants in American state and local courts are poor. Two, 
where secured money-bail is routinely imposed, the bail bond industry 
becomes an integral part of bail administration, and that can save courts 
money. When a defendant seeks the services of a bondsman, the 
bondsman screens him to determine if he is bail-worthy; if he is, the 
bondsman, for a fee, will become the defendant’s surety and accept 
responsibility for ensuring he appears at future court proceedings. This is 
a task for which the bondsman is highly motivated; if the defendant fails 
to appear, the bondsman stands to forfeit the collateral securing the bond. 
In this way, money-based bail administration can outsource some of the 
cost and burden of pretrial screening and supervision to the private sector. 
“Every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost” is an early 
16th century proverb teaching “that those who lag behind will receive no 
3
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aid.”3 Even modest bail amounts may be out of reach for most defendants. 
Where commercial bail is available, the only way out of jail for those 
defendants is to pay a bondsman a fee to obtain a secured bail bond. This 
fee is non-refundable; it is not returned even if charges are dismissed or 
the defendant is acquitted. Many bondsmen will finance bond fees, which 
puts defendants in debt. On the other hand, defendants who remain in jail 
pretrial are more likely to plead guilty, and they are more likely to 
experience long-term financial and personal hardship. Under either 
scenario, the poor defendant falls further behind. 
That secured money-bail penalizes poor defendants is hardly a recent 
discovery—it has been a topic of widespread discussion in the United 
States since the 1960s, and it is the driving force behind current bail 
reform efforts at the federal and state levels. As in earlier rounds of bail 
reform, much has been said recently about the pernicious effects of 
money-bail. There is little to add to this decades-long conversation that 
has not already been ably articulated by others. This article takes up a 
different question—in jurisdictions that continue to recognize an absolute 
right to bail for noncapital offenses and that routinely rely on secured 
money-bail as a condition of pretrial release, what are the risks and 
benefits of doing so in today’s legal and political climate? Although the 
themes of the current bail reform conversation have not changed much 
since the 1960s, the legal landscape has. Bail reform has taken different 
shapes in states that have moved away from money-based bail 
administration towards risk-based pretrial bail administration. Some of 
those states have completely overhauled their bail practices through 
constitutional amendments; some have voluntarily modified bail 
procedures through rule changes and legislation; and some have been 
forced to change their bail practices as a result of lawsuits. The most 
significant development in modern bail reform is courts’ increasing 
receptivity to claims that due process and equal protection guarantees are 
implicated when financial conditions of release result in the pretrial 
3. Gary Martin, The meaning and origin of the expression: The Devil take the hindmost, 
PHRASE FINDER (2019), http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/358400.html [https://perma.cc/D553-
5Z7E]. For an on-point application of the phrase in contemporary social commentary See Former Fla. 
Rep. Alan Grayson, Devil Take the Hindmost, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2011, 7:50 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-alan-grayson/devil-take-the-hindmost_b_904042.html. 
[https://perma.cc/C49S-HUWQ] (“‘Let the Devil Take the Hindmost’ refers to a situation where the 
Devil is chasing us. Some of us . . . are able to run away from the Devil. And those others . . . they 
can’t run as fast. They’re the hindmost. They’re the ones that the Devil catches, and destroys . . . . 
The Devil in America today is poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, bigotry, selfishness, ignorance, 
disease and death.”). 
4
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detention of indigent defendants charged with minor, nonviolent offenses 
simply because they are unable to post bail. 
Bail reform has been covered extensively in the popular media over 
the last several years. This coverage often includes calls to abolish money-
bail in the United States and points to the federal court system and 
Washington D.C. as examples of successful no-money-bail systems. The 
current bail reform conversation, unfortunately, sometimes glosses over 
important details about modern bail administration. For one, there is no 
such thing as a truly no-money-bail jurisdiction in the United States—all 
state and federal bail administration laws authorize money-bail as a 
condition of release in some circumstances. Further, bail administration 
in the United States today is exceedingly jurisdiction specific. There is no 
standard approach among jurisdictions to pretrial release and detention 
practices, bailability, preventive detention, or the regulation of 
commercial bail bonding. As a result, there is no national consensus about 
who is bailable and why, what role for-profit sureties should play in bail 
administration, or even more fundamentally, what the purpose of bail even 
is. Finally, scant attention has been paid to the inextricable relationship 
between bailability and money-bail, or the legitimate and valid reasons a 
state might continue to embrace a categorical right to bail for noncapital 
offenses despite the well-publicized downsides of money-bail. On its 
own, money-bail is not the problem, and bail reform is not a “one size fits 
all” proposition. This Article submits that any meaningful discussion of 
bail reform at the state level must be jurisdiction-specific, and it must 
account for the practical, historical, and philosophical aspects of the state 
constitutional right to bailability. 
Part II of this Article is an overview of the origins and history of 
English and American bail law. Part III describes the role and regulation 
of commercial bail bonding in the United States. Part IV traces the history 
and current state of bail reform in the United States. Part V considers legal 
and practical barriers to reform unique to right-to-bail states, particularly 
jurisdictions without the concentration and scale of resources to maintain 
the type of robust pretrial services programs that are the backbone of 
successful bail reform in large, urban jurisdictions. Moving away from 
money-bail in some jurisdictions may simply not be financially viable. 
But ignoring or perpetuating the undisputed negative impacts of money-
bail may no longer be an option either, as courts become more willing to 
entertain constitutional challenges to bail practices that result in the 
routine pretrial detention of indigent defendants charged with low-level, 
non-violent offenses. This Article concludes that right-to-bail 
jurisdictions that rely on secured money-bail as a standard condition of 
5
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release, but that do not take steps to ameliorate the many hardships 
money-based bail administration visits on indigent defendants, may find 
themselves “hindmost” in today’s bail reform world, forced to play catch-
up to a rapidly evolving jurisprudence and national sensibility. 
II. HISTORY AND LAW OF BAIL ADMINISTRATION4
A. Bail in England 
The American bail system traces its origins to the development of 
Anglo Saxon law in England over 1,000 years ago.5 The Anglo-Saxon 
penal system included the concepts of outlawry (declaring a wrongdoer 
outside the protection of the law and, therefore, subject to summary justice 
and execution), confiscation, and corporal and capital punishment.6 
Relevant to the development of bail, wrongs once addressed by feuds 
came to be settled through a system of “bots”—making reparation to 
compensate grievances.7 Under this system, an accused charged with a 
4. Scholars have written extensively on the history and evolution of bail in the English and
American criminal justice systems. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of 
the history of bail; it is intended only to provide background for the main discussion in this article. 
For further history and information on the development of bail law and administration see RONALD 
GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); June Carbone, Seeing 
Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 
34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517 (1983); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959 (1965); Caleb Foote, The Coming of Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1125 (1965); Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Claire M. B. Brooker, The History of 
Bail and Pretrial Release, https://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4XY-EGHU] (updated Sept. 24, 2010). 
5. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
6. J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57 (1883) (“The 
punishments appointed for [crimes known to Anglo-Saxon law] were either fines or corporal 
punishment, which was either death, mutilation, or, in some cases, flogging. Imprisonment is not . . . 
mentioned in the laws as a punishment, though it is referred to as a way of securing a person who 
could not give security.”); see also FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, Vol. I 26 (1895). (“Imprisonment occurs 
in the Anglo-Saxon laws only as a means of temporary security. . . . Before the Conquest, outlawry 
involved not only forfeiture of goods to the king, but liability to be killed with impunity.”). 
7. STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 57 (“The wer was a price set upon a man according to his rank
in life. If he was killed the wer was to be paid to his relations. . . . If he was outlawed his sureties 
(borhs) might have to pay his wer. Bot was compensation to a person injured by a crime.”); Id. at 59–
60 (“[I]t should be remembered that in early times the really efficient check upon crimes of violence 
was the fear of private vengeance, which rapidly degenerated into private war, blood feuds, and 
anarchy. The institution of the wer itself implies this. . . . [I]t belongs properly to a period when the 
idea of public punishment for crimes had not yet become familiar; a period when a crime was still 
regarded to a great extent as an act of war[.]”); see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 24 
(“Personal injury is in the first place a cause of feud, of private war between the kindreds of the wrong-
doer and of the person wronged. . . . But the feud may be appeased by the acceptance of a composition. 
6
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crime would be set free before trial, but only if a surety pledged both that 
the defendant would appear for trial, and that the “bot” would be satisfied 
if he were convicted.8 The pledge was the surety’s bond, or promise; bail 
was the amount that guaranteed the bond. Bail was equal to the amount of 
the “bot” (the reparation due the injured party). If the accused were found 
guilty or fled, the surety would be bound to pay the bot to the injured 
party.9 Thus, the original function of bail was to secure the defendant’s 
presence at trial and provide financial satisfaction to victims with 
meritorious claims in the event the wrongdoer absconded. Setting bail, 
therefore required assessing the likelihood that the victim would win at 
trial and the value of the victim’s claim.10 Not all accused defendants were 
bailable,11 but those who were could secure their pretrial liberty by 
producing “sufficient sureties” with a bail amount “perfectly linked to the 
outcome of trial—money for money.”12 This symmetry between the 
Some kind of arbitration was probably resorted to from a very early time to fix the amount. The next 
stage is a scale of compensation fixed by custom or enactment for death or minor injuries, which may 
be graduated according to the rank of the person injured. . . . [T]his naturally leads to the kindred 
being first expected by public opinion and then required by public authority not to pursue the feud if 
the proper composition is forthcoming, except in a few extreme cases[.]”); Id. at 26 (“Wer . . . is the 
value set on a man’s life, increasing with his rank. . . . Bót . . . is a more general word, including 
compensation of any kind.”). 
8. See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. 2000), as modified (Mar. 15, 2000)
(“Bail was an Anglo–Saxon invention designed to complement a monetary fine or ‘bot’ system, which 
was intended to guarantee both the appearance of an accused and payment of the ‘bot’ upon 
conviction. Bail developed when most of the punishments applicable to freemen were money fines.”) 
(citing Carbone, supra note 4, at 519–20).  
9. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 349 (“The concept of bail surety evolved out of necessity when a
shortage of traveling magistrates resulted in accused persons being jailed for lengthy periods before 
trial. The bail system and its reliance on personal surety emerged to prevent excessive pretrial 
detention. Personal surety referred to a reputable friend, relative, or neighbor into whose custody the 
accused would be released. This system allowed the accused to be released into the custody of the 
personal surety who would then be responsible for the accused’s appearance at trial. The bail amount 
was normally equal to the monetary penalty, so if the accused fled, he was presumed guilty and the 
personal surety became responsible for the monetary penalty.”) (citing DANIEL J. FREED & PATRICIA 
M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 1–3 (1964); WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN 
AMERICA 11 (1976); Carbone, supra note 4, at 520). 
10. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 (“Because the amount of the pledge was identical to 
the amount of the fine upon conviction, the system accounted for the seriousness of the crime and 
fulfilled the debt owed if the accused did not appear for trial.”). 
11. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 48 (“Some of the gravest offences, especially
against the king and his peace, are said to be bótleás, ‘bootless’; that is, the offender is not entitled to 
redeem himself at all, and is at the king’s mercy.”); see also STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 57–58 
(“Speaking generally, all crimes were, on a first conviction, punishable by wer, bot, and wite [a fine 
paid to the king or other lord in respect of an offence] . . . . A certain number of cases were bot-less 
or inexpiable—and the punishment for them was death or mutilation on the first offence.”).  
12. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 n.6 (“If they fled, they were declared ‘outlaws,’ 
subject to immediate justice from whoever tracked them down. Apparently, however, certain offenses 
were considered to be ‘absolutely irreplevisable,’ requiring some form of prison to house the 
7
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amount of the “bot” and the amount required to secure the bond led one 
scholar to observe that “[t]he Anglo-Saxon bail process was perhaps the 
last entirely rational application of bail.”13 
Anglo-Saxon law controlled in England from the sixth century until 
the Norman Conquest in 1066. Following the Norman invasion, 
wrongdoing previously considered a private matter instead became an 
affront to public peace for which the wrongdoer answered to the regional 
authority.14 Ultimately, disturbances to the peace became viewed as 
offenses against the Crown, a public criminal law concept that anchors the 
American criminal justice system today.15 Summary mutilations and 
executions, permitted under Anglo-Saxon law, were phased out, but the 
use of corporal punishment increased, which gave offenders an incentive 
to flee pretrial to avoid punishment.16 As penalties for wrongdoing 
changed, so did the idea that anyone was bondable, which led to 
recognition of non-bondable offenses.17 The principle of non-bondable 
offenses is reflected today in state constitutional bail provisions that 
exclude capital offenses from the absolute right to bail by sufficient 
sureties.18 
offenders.”). 
13. Carbone, supra note 4, at 520. 
14. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 22 (“Preservation of the peace and punishment of 
offences were dealt with, in England as elsewhere, partly under the customary jurisdiction of the local 
courts, partly by the special authority of the king. In England that authority gradually superseded all 
others. All criminal offenses have long been said to be committed against the king’s peace[.]”). 
15. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6 at 24 (“In Anglo-Saxon as well as in other Germanic 
laws we find that the idea of wrong to a person or his kindred is still primary, and that of offence 
against the common weal secondary, even in the gravest cases. Only by degrees did the modern 
principles prevail, that the members of the commonwealth must be content with the remedies afforded 
them by law, and must not seek private vengeance, and that on the other hand public offences cannot 
be remitted or compounded by private bargain.”); POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 24 (“The 
conception of an offence done to the State in its corporate person, or . . . as represented by the king” 
post-dated Anglo Saxon law).  
16. State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. 2000), as modified (Mar. 15, 2000) (“The 
Anglo–Saxon bail system changed when corporal punishment replaced the ‘bot’ system for most 
criminal offenses. Bail availability was increasingly restricted, in part because corporal punishment 
afforded an accused greater incentive to flee.”) (citing Carbone, supra note 4, at 521–22). 
17. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–3 (“The first to lose any right to bail . . . were persons 
accused of homicide, followed by persons accused of ‘forest offenses’ (i.e. violating the royal forests), 
and finally a catch-all discretionary category of persons accused ‘of any other retto [wrong] for which 
according to English custom he is not replevisable [bailable].’”) (citing Carbone, supra note 4, at 
523). 
18. The first statute of Westminster foreshadowed the right to bailability by surety that was
included in most states’ original constitutions. STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 234–35. It provided that 
“certain prisoners shall not be replevisable either ‘by the common writ or without writ;’ that others 
shall ‘be let out by sufficient surety[.]’” Id. Persons who were not bailable at that time included 
persons detained “for the death of man or by commandment of the king, or of his justices, or for the 
8
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Further developments in English bail law occurred in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries as the Crown began to exercise more centralized 
control over criminal processes. It did so, in part, to address corruption by 
local sheriffs, who were authorized to hold persons accused of crimes and 
to administer bail.19 English bail rights were developed and refined 
primarily in five foundational Anglo-American laws: the Magna Carta in 
1215; the Statute of Westminster I in 1275; the Petition of Right in 1628; 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679; and the English Bill of Rights of 1689.20 
Following exposure of widespread abuse in the bail process, Parliament 
passed the first Statute of Westminster in 1275.21 The Statute “assembled 
and codified 51 existing laws—many originating from the Magna 
Carta.”22 One of the topics the Statute covered was bail. The Statute both 
departed from Anglo-Saxon law and reaffirmed it—it “departed from 
traditional Anglo-Saxon customs by establishing three criteria to govern 
bailability: (1) the nature of the offense (categorizing offenses that were 
and were not bailable); (2) the probability of conviction . . . and (3) the 
forest[;] . . . prisoners outlawed; men who had abjured the realm (and so admitted their guilt); 
approvers [an accomplice to a felony who confesses guilt and gives evidence against his confederates] 
(who had confessed); such as be taken with the manour” [also “manner”; apprehended with the stolen 
thing in one’s possession; caught in the act—see SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1818)]; “those which have broken the king’s prison; thieves openly defamed and known, 
and such as are appealed (accused) by approvers;” those “taken for felonious arsons; or for false 
money; or for counterfeiting the king’s seal; or persons excommunicate taken at the request of the 
bishop or for manifest offences; or for treason touching the king himself.” STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 
234–35. 
19. STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 234 (“The sheriff was the local representative of the Crown, and 
in particular he was the head of all the executive part of the administration of criminal justice. In that 
capacity he . . . arrested and imprisoned suspected persons, and, if he thought proper, admitted them 
to bail. The discretionary power of the sheriff was ill defined, and led to great abuses, which were 
dealt with by the Statute of Westminster the First . . . [of 1275]. This statute was for 550 years the 
main foundation of the law of bail.”). 
20. Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 909, 916–17 (2013). 
21. See JOHNSON, supra note 18. See also Statutes of Westminster (1275, 1285, 1290), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Statutes-of-Westminster 
[https://perma.cc/237P-4RPU] (“Statutes of Westminster, three statutes important in medieval 
English history, issued in ‘parliaments’ held by Edward I at Westminster. Each comprised a 
miscellaneous series of clauses designed to amend or clarify extremely diverse aspects of the law, 
both civil and criminal.”).  
22. Hegreness, supra note 20, at 918 (“While the Petition of Right reinforced the principle that 
a person could not be detained without being charged, the Habeas Corpus Act provided the right 
mechanism by which a person could obtain release when they were unlawfully detained for bailable 
offenses. Although the procedure for habeas corpus was not codified until the Habeas Corpus Act, 
the essence of habeas corpus (which, in Latin, means ‘you shall have the body’) crystallized during 
the thirteenth century, contemporaneously with the codification of the right to bail in the Magna Carta 
and the Statute of Westminster I.”) (citing William F. Duker, The English Origin of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus: A Peculiar Path of Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983, 992–96 (1978)). 
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criminal history of the accused, often referred to as [his] bad character or 
‘ill fame[.]’”23 At the same time, the Statute “rearticulated rather than 
abandoned the conclusion of the Anglo-Saxons that the bail process must 
mirror the outcome of the trial . . . each criterion . . . [reflects] a simple 
standard: the seriousness of the offense offset by the likelihood of 
acquittal.”24 The Petition of Rights in 1628 established the principle that 
authorities could not detain a person without charges.25 
English law adopted additional reforms in the 1600s to address 
detention practices, which included long delays between a defendant’s 
arrest and the inquiry into his bailability. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 
allowed a prisoner accused of any crime other than treason or an identified 
felony to seek a writ directing that he be promptly admitted to bail.26 Other 
abuses addressed included the practice of setting bail in an amount that a 
detainee could not meet, which resulted in a de facto denial of bail. To 
address the issue of unpayable bail amounts, the English Bill of Rights of 
1689 provided that “excessive bail ought not be required.”27 This 
principle, of course, eventually made its way into the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.28 
23. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
24. Carbone, supra note 4, at 526. 
25. Hegreness, supra note 20, at 918 (“[T]he Petition of Right reinforced the principle that a
person could not be detained without being charged, the Habeas Corpus Act provided the right 
mechanism by which a person could obtain release when they were unlawfully detained for bailable 
offenses.”). 
26. STEPHENS, supra note 6, at 243 (The Act “provides that any person committed to prison
‘for any crime unless for treason or felony plainly expressed in the warrant of commitment,’ may 
obtain a writ of habeas corpus from the lord chancellor or any judge of the common-law courts. The 
writ being served on the gaoler, and certain conditions being complied with it as to expenses, a return 
must be made to the writ within three days. Upon the return, the judge is required to admit the prisoner 
to bail.”). 
27. English Bill of Rights (1689) art. 10; Hegreness, supra note 20, at 919 (“After the Habeas 
Corpus Act was passed, only one great loophole remained: Officials could ‘requir[e] bail to a greater 
amount than the nature of the case demands.’ Such excessive bail was a de facto denial of bail for 
bailable offenses, violating the spirit, though not the letter, of the law. The English Bill of Rights 
closed this final loophole. Like the U.S. Bill of Rights that it inspired, the English Bill of Rights of 
1689 forbade ‘excessive bail.’ The English Bill of Rights thus prevented de facto denials: when 
offenses are bailable, the amount set for bail cannot be ‘excessive.’”). 
28. Hegreness, supra note 20, at 919. 
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B. Bail in America 
1. Bailability under the Federal and State Constitutions
The bail laws of the individual states were, at one point, remarkably 
consistent; most original state constitutions29 protected two distinct 
interests in bail. The first interest was a right to have bail set for most 
offenses. This guarantee appeared in the original constitutions of 41 
states.30 With minor variations in wording, they provided that all persons 
“shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,” except for capital offenses31 or 
other serious offenses for which “the proof is evident or the presumption 
great.”32 In contrast, the federal Eighth Amendment does not contain an 
29. Some states have amended or re-written their constitutions multiple times over the years.
Mississippi, for example, rewrote its original constitution of 1817 in 1982, 1861, 1868, and 1890. 
Louisiana re-wrote its original constitution of 1812 in 1845, 1852, 1861, 1864, 1868, 1879, 1898, 
1913, 1921, and 1974. Historical and contemporary versions of state constitutions can be accessed at: 
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/Search.aspx [https://perma.cc/DET2-ST3E]. 
30. The nine states whose original constitutions contained no bailability provision are Georgia 
(GA. CONST. of 1777), Hawaii (HAW. CONST. of 1959), Maryland (MD. CONST. of 1776), 
Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. of 1780), New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. of 1784), New York (N.Y. 
CONST. of 1777), Virginia (VA. CONST. of 1776), West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. of 1863). North 
Carolina’s constitution of 1776 contained a bailability provision, (N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. 39) which 
was removed from its 1868 constitution. Its current constitution also does not contain a bailability 
provision. N.C. CONST. of 1971. This observation only covers state constitutional protections; states 
without constitutional bailability provisions often protected the right through statutory or common 
law. See Hegreness, supra note 20, at 916 (surveying state constitutional and statutory bail law and 
noting that of the nine states that did not include a bailability provision in their constitution, eight 
protected the right elsewhere by statute). 
31. States’ designations of which offenses were, or are, capital offenses, of course, may vary.
Generally speaking, states designated more offenses as capital offenses historically and not all crimes 
that carried a potential death penalty involved grievous harm to another person, as is the case under 
modern law. See Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical 
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 348–49 (1982) (“The scheme of classification of capital crimes 
in the colonial era is . . . too complex to support an inference that there was a widely accepted belief 
that all dangerous crimes were punished by the death penalty. Many dangerous crimes did carry the 
death penalty during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but many did not. While the colonists 
of Massachusetts . . . defined as capital such dangerous crimes as murder, treason, and rape, the 
colonists also made capital several crimes that could not have posed a significant threat to society—
children over sixteen cursing or smiting their natural parents . . . or a son over sixteen failing to ‘obey 
the voice of his father or his mother.’ Conversely, many crimes that must have posed a significant 
danger to a seventeenth century New England community, such as arson, burglary, and robbery, were 
absent from the colonists’ list of capital crimes.”). 
32. Hegreness, supra note 20, at 916 (original constitutions of forty one states contained a
“consensus right to bail—a reference to bailability by “sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses 
when the proof is evident or the presumption great[;]” and eight others protected the right by statute). 
See also Verrilli Jr. supra note 31, at 350. (The right to bail after 1789 also solidified through the 
vehicle of state constitutions. Specifically, although only two of the original colonies—North Carolina 
and Pennsylvania—retained a specific right to bail in their state constitutions, every state that joined 
the Union after 1789, excluding West Virginia and Hawaii, included a right to bail.). See also State 
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express right to bail; it does not mention bailability, nor sureties.33 The 
second bail interest protected by state constitutions is a prohibition on 
excessive bail. With the exception of Illinois, all state constitutions mirror 
the federal Constitution and explicitly prohibit excessive bail.34 
Where bailability by sufficient sureties is guaranteed, a defendant 
charged with an offense that is not specifically designated as nonbailable 
is bailable as a matter of right. The only limitation on this right is the 
court’s power to demand “sufficient sureties” to secure the defendant’s 
appearance at future proceedings. Thus, a defendant charged with a 
bailable offense is entitled to pretrial release if the defendant produces 
“sufficient sureties.”35 A “sufficient surety” can be a condition of release 
with a financial component, such as a pledge of money or property as 
collateral subject to forfeiture if the defendant absconds. But it doesn’t 
have to be—it can also be a non-financial bail condition, such as a promise 
to appear that is not backed by any monetary pledge or collateral.36 
v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000), as modified (Mar. 15, 2000) (“Although the American 
colonies initially accepted many aspects of the English bail system, some eventually shied away from 
the Statute of Westminster’s confusing categorization of who was bailable. Instead, these colonies 
redefined the right to bail. Pennsylvania, for example, adopted the Great Law of 1682, which provided 
that ‘all Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties, unless for capital Offenses, where the proof 
is evident or presumption great.’ This language, which was ultimately incorporated into the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, became the model for almost every state constitution adopted after 1776. 
Consequently, approximately two-thirds of state constitutions . . . contain similar or identical 
language.”) (citing Carbone, supra note 4, at 529–32). 
33. Federal courts have, to date, uniformly rejected the argument that federal defendants
charged with non-capital offenses have a right to bail. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. Some 
writers argue that it is an open question whether the omission of a bailability clause from the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted to mean there is no federal constitutional bailability right. See, e.g., 
Hegreness, supra note 20, at 916 (the state constitutional backdrop of the federal Eighth Amendment 
shows there is a federal constitutional right to bail except in capital cases). 
34. Hegreness, supra note 20, at 916. 
35. See, e.g., State v. Sutherland, 987 P.2d 501, 503–04 (Or. 1999) (en banc) (interpreting
Oregon’s constitutional provision that all “[o]ffences (sic), except murder, and treason, shall be 
bailable by sufficient sureties” to require the trial court to set bail in cases other than those involving 
murder or treason: “by using the mandatory ‘shall,’ the text of [Oregon’s constitutional bailability 
provision], Article I, section 14, requires courts to set bail for defendants accused of crimes other than 
murder or treason. . . . under that provision [with the exception cases of murder or treason] . . . the 
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to be admitted to bail.”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted).  
36. Burton v. Tomlinson, 527 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. App. 1974) (“The constitutional provision 
requires only that ‘Offenses (sic) . . . shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.’ Nowhere does it say that 
lawful release of a defendant may be accomplished only through the medium of sureties. Were this 
contention sound, release of a defendant on his own recognizance or by any other means would be 
constitutionally prohibited—an obvious absurdity.”). See also Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 
(Ark. 2016) (rejecting the notion that “sufficient sureties” entitles a defendant bail by secured bond 
and prohibits cash-only bonds: “Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘sufficient’ as ‘Adequate; of such 
quality, number, force, or value as is necessary for a given purpose.’ ‘Surety’ as: ‘A formal assurance; 
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2. Federal Constitutional Constraints on Bail
Bail and pretrial detention practices implicate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail,37 and federal due process 
guarantees.38 Where an accused is indigent, equal protection may also be 
triggered.39 Because the Eighth Amendment doesn’t have a bailability 
provision, there is little federal constitutional jurisprudence on bailability. 
The Supreme Court addressed Eighth Amendment excessiveness in Stack 
v. Boyle,40 decided in 1951. It has said relatively little on the matter since.
Stack is a McCarthy-era case in which the federal government charged 
twelve defendants with conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.41 The twelve 
defendants initially had bail set in amounts ranging from $2,500–
$100,000.42 One defendant, who was arrested outside the charging 
district, successfully moved to have his bail reduced to $50,000 before his 
case was transferred to the charging district.43 On the government’s 
motion, the trial court subsequently set bail for each of the twelve 
defendants in the uniform amount of $50,000.44 The defendants then 
moved for a reduction in bail arguing that, in light of their individual 
financial resources, family ties, health, and criminal histories, their bail 
was excessive under the Eighth Amendment.45 The district court denied 
the motion to reduce bail, and the defendants filed a petition for habeas 
corpus. This was also denied.46 The defendants appealed to the Ninth 
esp., a pledge, bond, guarantee, or security given for the fulfillment of an undertaking.’ Here, applying 
the obvious and common meaning to the language in the constitution, ‘sufficient sureties’ is an 
adequate, formal assurance or guarantee for the stated purpose. In other words, an adequate guarantee 
to ensure the accused’s presence at trial.”). 
37. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required . . .” U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII. 
38. In a federal prosecution, federal due process issues are cognizable under the Fifth
Amendment and in a state prosecution, under the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987) (Fourteenth Amendment requires that pretrial detention laws 
“serve a compelling governmental interest”; and that federal court proceedings comport with the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment). Federal due process in tribal court is guaranteed by federal 
statute and by the laws of individual tribes. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(a)(8) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property 
without due process of law[.]”).  
39. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
40. 342 U.S. 1. 
41. Id. at 3. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2385. 
42. 342 U.S. at 3. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3–4. 
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Circuit, which affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.47 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The limited purpose 
of bail, the Court explained, is to assure the defendant’s presence at trial. 
The district court’s bail procedure was flawed, the Court held, because it 
ignored traditional standards48 courts must consider to ensure that the 
amount of bail for each defendant is tailored to the purpose of bail.49 Since 
the purpose of bail is limited to securing the defendant’s presence at future 
proceedings, the Court concluded, bail set at a figure higher than an 
amount necessary to secure a defendant’s presence is excessive.50 The 
Court described $50,000 as “unusually high,” relative to the penalties 
faced by the defendants. But it did not hold the amount to be excessive. 
The flaw in the district court’s ruling, the Court held, was that it lacked 
any factual basis to justify the amount as necessary to ensure each 
defendant’s presence at trial.51 The issue in Stack was procedural—the 
Court held that pretrial detainees have a right to individualized bail 
determinations; it did not resolve whether a $50,000 bail amount was 
excessive for any of the twelve defendants in that case.52 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 4 (citing the version of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 46(c) in force at the time, which provided: 
“If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as . . . will insure the presence 
of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of 
the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the 
defendant.”). The Court decided Stack before Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which, 
as discussed, recognized an additional purpose for bail—preventive pretrial detention of potentially 
dangerous defendants to protect public safety. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
49. Id. at 5 (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant 
must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. The 
traditional standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each 
case to each defendant. . . . [P]etitioners face imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of 
not more than $10,000. It is not denied that bail for each petitioner has been fixed in a sum much 
higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties and yet there has been no factual 
showing to justify such action.”). 
50. Id. at 5 (“The modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money
subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure 
higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purposes is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
51. Id. at 5–6 (“Upon final judgment of conviction, petitioners face imprisonment of not more 
than five years and a fine of not more than $10,000. It is not denied that bail for each petitioner has 
been fixed in a sum much higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties and yet 
there has been no factual showing to justify such action in this case. The Government asks the courts 
to depart from the norm by assuming, without the introduction of evidence, that each petitioner is a 
pawn in a conspiracy and will, in obedience to a superior, flee the jurisdiction. To infer from the fact 
of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act.”). 
52. Following the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Court addressed the question
of whether considerations other than a risk of flight, specifically future dangerousness, can inform a 
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Bail administration practices that burden a defendant’s interest in 
pretrial liberty can raise due process concerns53 under both the federal due 
process clause and under the laws of the states.54 Every state has 
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to bail administration and 
procedure.55 To the extent that they vary, these variations may create due 
process guarantees unique to different jurisdictions. Where indigents are 
affected differently by bail practices, equal protection guarantees may also 
be implicated.56 The Supreme Court has invalidated facially neutral 
criminal laws that deprive a convicted defendant of liberty based on his 
indigence on equal protection grounds.57 It is unclear whether these 
precedents extend to pretrial detention generally or to the practice of 
setting unpayable bail specifically.58 It is also unclear what level of 
scrutiny—heightened or strict—applies in the bail administration 
context.59 
court’s pretrial detention decision. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. However, the Court has 
provided scant guidance on substantive Eighth Amendment excessiveness. It has not addressed, for 
example, whether, as a constitutional matter, setting bail at an amount higher than a defendant can 
afford is permissible, or whether setting bail in any amount is excessive if there is no risk a defendant 
will flee. 
53. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Arizona
constitutional bail provision denying bail to undocumented immigrants as violation of substantive due 
process). 
54. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citation omitted). 
55. See infra notes 100–121, 123 and accompanying text. 
56. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
57. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–99 (1971) (invalidating facially neutral statute that
authorized imprisonment for failure to pay fines because it violated the equal protection rights of 
indigents); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1970) (invalidating facially neutral statute that 
required convicted defendants to remain in jail beyond the maximum sentence if they could not pay 
other fines associated with their sentences because it violated the equal protection rights of indigents). 
58. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.2(b) (4th ed.) 
(“notwithstanding the forceful argument by some commentators in support of the equal protection 
argument, the courts have not been inclined to accept the equal protection argument that bail is 
unconstitutional when set in an amount a particular indigent defendant cannot meet.”).  
59. Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270, 1276–77 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied Arizona v. Martinez, 
138 S. Ct. 146 (2017) (noting confusion over “the level of scrutiny courts should apply to mandatory 
detention laws” and concluding that bail restrictions are subject to heightened scrutiny, not strict 
scrutiny under Supreme Court precedent.); see also Brangan v. Commonwealth., 80 N.E.3d 949, 961 
(Mass. 2017) (Although defendants are not constitutionally entitled to affordable bail, due process 
imposes “strict standards” when defendants are held on an unaffordable bail). 
15
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3. Bail Reform in the Federal Courts
a. Bail Reform Act of 1966 – Money-Bail Gets Sidelined
Because the United States Constitution contains no bailability 
provision, bail and detention decisions in federal court have long been 
governed by statute. The federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided 
defendants charged with noncapital offenses a right to bail, and gave 
magistrates discretion to grant or deny bail to federal defendants charged 
with capital offenses.60 Up until the 1960s, federal court bail 
administration looked much as it does today in states where secured 
money-bail bonds are routinely ordered as a condition of release—judges 
fixed bail amounts, and commercial money-bail bondsmen decided who 
got bail.61 Federal bail administration changed significantly under the 
leadership of United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy. In 1963, 
he instructed his United States Attorneys to request pretrial release on 
defendants’ own recognizance wherever possible.62 He then convened the 
National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice to bring participants in 
the criminal justice system together, specifically to discuss alternatives to 
money-bail.63 The report and initiatives generated from this conference 
eventually led to passage of the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.64 This 
was the first time federal bail administration underwent major reform 
since Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
The main goal of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was to address and 
ameliorate hardships to indigents caused by the use of money-bail in 
federal court.65 The 1966 Act created an entirely new bail administration 
procedure aimed at preventing pretrial detention based solely on 
60. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1976)). 
61. See Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J. concurring)
(“The effect of . . . a system [based on secured money bail bonds] is that the professional bondsmen 
hold the keys to the jail in their pockets. They determine for whom they will act as surety – who in 
their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen’s judgment, and the ones who are unable 
to pay the bondsmen’s fees, remain in jail. The court [is] . . . relegated to the relatively unimportant 
chore of fixing the amount of bail.”). 
62. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (citing National Conference on Bail and Criminal
Justice, Proceedings and Interim Report (Washington D.C. Apr. 1965) at 297). 
63. SCHNACKE, ET. AL., supra note 4, at 11. 
64. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–465, 80 Stat. 214. 
65. SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12; Verrilli, Jr., supra note 31, at 330 n.13 (“The federal 
Bail Reform Act of 1966 . . . worked a significant change in th[e] process on the federal level. Under 
the money-bail system a severe hardship was inflicted on the indigent. Found to pose only a slight 
risk of flight, but without resources to meet even a modest bail, indigent defendants often languished 
in jail pending trial.”). 
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indigency.66 The key features of the Act included a presumption that 
defendants were to be released pretrial on their own recognizance for 
noncapital offenses,67 and a mandatory preference for release on non-
monetary conditions and unsecured appearance bonds. Under the 1966 
Act, a federal court could only require a cash deposit or a secured bond if 
it found non-financial conditions would not reasonably assure the 
defendant’s future appearance.68 The 1966 Act also created a hierarchy of 
conditions of release that disfavored the use of secured money-bail 
bonds.69 Finally, the 1966 Act directed federal courts to consider the 
defendant’s individual circumstances in evaluating what conditions of 
release were necessary to reasonably assure the defendant’s future 
appearance. These considerations included the nature and circumstances 
of the crimes charged, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, 
the defendant’s community and family ties, employment and financial 
information, character and mental condition, prior criminal history, and 
66. See Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 2 (“The Purpose of the Act is to revise the practices related 
to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained 
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves 
neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”). Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: 
Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1329–30 
(2012) (“Federal bail remained relatively unchanged from the Judiciary Act of 1789 until 1966, when 
Congress passed the first bail reform act. The 1966 Bail Reform Act . . . was designed in large part to 
reduce the high bails imposed by judges to prevent release of certain defendants. The 1966 Bail 
Reform Act relied heavily on custodial supervision to ensure proper behavior, requiring judges to 
consider a variety of release conditions and release defendants under the most minimal release 
strictures possible.”). 
67. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–465, 80 Stat. 214. Section 3 of the Act amended 
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) to read:  
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall, at 
his appearance before a judicial officer, be order released pending trial on his personal 
recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount spec-
ified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, 
that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. 
Id. 
68. Id. (“[w]hen [a determination is made that release on non-financial conditions will not
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance] the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition 
to the above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release . . . or, if no 
single condition gives that assurance, any combination of [five listed] . . . conditions[.]” The five 
conditions, in order, are: (1) release to a person or organization willing to supervise the defendant, (2) 
travel, association, or residence restrictions, (3) execution of an appearance bond, secured by a cash 
deposit with the court, not to exceed 10 percent of the bail amount, to be returned to the defendant 
upon performance of conditions of release, (4) execution of a secured bail bond, or deposit of a full 
cash bond, and (5) any other condition reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance, 
including allowing for day or work release from custody.).   
69. Id. (listing secured money bail bonds fourth, after refundable appearance bonds secured by 
a percentage of the bail amount and deposited directly with the court). 
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prior failures to appear.70 In this way, the 1966 Act displaced the use of 
money-bail and established release on personal recognizance (no-money-
bail) as the default pretrial release condition in federal court.71 
b. Bail Reform Act of 1984 – Preventive Detention
Authorized
Federal statutory bail reform in the 1960s focused entirely on flight 
risk—if a noncapital defendant were deemed likely to appear, the law 
would require his release. In focusing entirely on flight risk, Congress 
ignored the third rail of bail administration—preventive pretrial detention 
of noncapital defendants who may pose a risk of harm to the community 
while on pretrial release. Whether a court can lawfully detain a defendant 
pretrial who is merely accused of a crime based on a prediction of future 
dangerousness was an unresolved legal issue when Congress undertook 
federal bail reform in the 1960s. As noted, in money-based bail 
administration, an unauthorized, yet tacitly tolerated, practice to 
incapacitate bailable, yet potentially dangerous defendants is to set bail in 
an unpayable amount.72 This is one of the clearest examples of the misuse 
of money-bail in bail administration.73 The courts, however, have never 
70. Id. amending 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b). 
71. Jurisdictions, like the federal courts and Washington D.C., are sometimes referred to as
“no-money-bail” jurisdictions. This is inaccurate because all jurisdictions, including those, authorize 
money or property bail bonding, including secured money-bail bonds. In practice, however, not all 
jurisdictions authorize the trial court’s use of, and reliance on, money-bail to the same degree in bail 
administration. Thus, the pertinent question is the extent to which a jurisdiction’s laws disfavor, de-
prioritize, or discourage trial courts’ use of money or property bail bonds as a condition of pretrial 
release, and the extent to which it relegates secured money-bail to a position of last resort in its 
hierarchy of release conditions. 
72. See John V. Ryan, Last Days of Bail, 58 J. OF CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 542, 
548 (1967) (“Although it has never been proven, there have been repeated suggestions that the bail 
setter often sets bail with the intention of keeping a defendant in jail to protect society or a certain 
individual. That this manipulation of the bail system takes place is practically unprovable, since the 
bail setter has such wide discretion.”). 
73. An-Li Herring, States and Cities Take Steps to Reform ‘Dishonest’ Bail System, NPR
(December 17, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/12/17/505852280/states-and-cities-take-
steps-to-reform-dishonest-bail-system [https://perma.cc/Y8RW-DZRP] (“It is common for judges to 
set bail based solely on the charges a defendant faces, without regard to the defendant’s criminal 
history or financial means. . . . [In 2014, New Mexico’s] high court prompted [a] reform effort with 
a ruling . . . that found that a defendant had been wrongly detained for more than two years on 
$250,000 bail.”); Anne Kim, Time to Abolish Cash Bail, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Jan.–Feb. 2017, 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/januaryfebruary-2017/time-to-abolish-cash-bail/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3JL-SMHG] (“Under a system of cash bail, a defendant’s pretrial freedom is 
largely a function of his wealth—not about the risk of reoffending or failing to show up in 
court. Judges might set higher bail amounts for defendants they perceive as higher risk—on the theory 
that they won’t get out[.] . . . Indigent defendants who can’t afford even token amounts of bail stay 
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found that setting bail in an amount the defendant cannot afford in order 
to keep him locked up pending trial violates state or federal excessive bail 
prohibitions.74 
Congress took money-bail off the table in most federal cases with the 
1966 Act by authorizing money-bail only as a last resort and prohibiting 
pretrial detention based on a defendant’s inability to meet a financial 
condition of release. In some views, by doing this, Congress created a 
public safety gap because it left no authorized grounds for detaining 
dangerous, noncapital defendants pretrial.75 In 1970, in response to 
concerns raised by the District of Columbia, which is governed by federal 
law, Congress amended the 1966 Act to permit courts in the District of 
Columbia to consider future dangerousness, along with risk of flight, in 
release and detention decisions in that jurisdiction.76 
The preventive pretrial detention debate continued at the federal 
level until Congress put it to rest with the Bail Reform Act of 1984,77 
trapped in jail as if they were high-risk suspects likely to commit new crimes or flee. Meanwhile, a 
murderer with money could be out on the streets.”). 
74. LaFave, et al., supra note 58 (“‘[A]n impecunious person who pledges a small amount of
collateral constituting all or almost all of his property is likely to have a stake at least as great as that 
of a wealthy person who pledges a large amount constituting a modest part of his property.’ But it is 
a substantial jump from that truism to the proposition that an amount of bail which a defendant cannot 
meet because of his poverty is thereby ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment. Courts have refused 
to take that leap; they instead continue to adhere to the proposition that bail ‘is not excessive merely 
because the defendant is unable to pay it.’”) (citations omitted). See also Brangan v. Commonwealth., 
80 N.E.3d 949, 954–60 (Mass. 2017) (court not required to set bail in amount defendant can afford if 
other relevant considerations weigh more heavily than the defendant’s ability to provide the necessary 
security for his appearance at trial; if defendant lacks financial resources to post bail, “such that his 
indigency likely will result in a long-term pretrial detention,” court must provide findings of fact and 
statement of reasons); United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (bail “is not 
constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy [it]”); White v. 
Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968) (“mere fact that petitioner may not have been able to pay 
the bail does not make it excessive.”); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(“bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is unable to pay it.”); State v. Pratt, 166 A.3d 
600 (Vt. 2017) (“Constitution does not require that a defendant have the ability to pay the required 
bail if it is otherwise reasonable”). 
75. Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of the Bail 
Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspectives, 32 PACE L. REV. 800, 
813 (2012) (“Following the enactment of the 1966 Act, it became clear that the risk of flight alone 
was an inadequate ground on which to base the bail decision. [It was noted in the debates over the 
1984 reforms] . . . that, since passage of the 1966 Act, the judiciary had adopted a de facto 
consideration of dangerousness ‘by denominating defendants as flight risks and setting a high bail’. . . 
Thus, federal courts were taking matters into their own hands, effectively denying bail in cases where 
they deemed defendants to be dangerous by setting inordinately high bail, albeit on stated grounds of 
risk of flight.”) (citation omitted). 
76. D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 
(1970). 
77. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1984). 
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which was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.78 The 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 continues to govern bail administration in 
federal court. The 1984 Act retained the 1966 Act’s preference for pretrial 
release79 of most federal defendants,80 and for unsecured appearance 
bonds over secured bonds.81 The 1984 Act also specifically prohibited 
setting bail in an amount that results in the defendant’s detention.82 For 
the first time in federal court, the 1984 Act explicitly authorized 
preventive pretrial detention without bail of noncapital defendants.83 The 
1984 Act authorized federal courts to consider future dangerousness in 
making detention decisions, and allowed detention of defendants without 
bail on a showing that release “will endanger the safety of any other 
person or the community.”84 The 1984 Act also created a rebuttable 
78. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
79. The Act treats release of convicted defendants pending sentencing or appeal differently
from release of defendants awaiting trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (release or detention pending 
sentencing or appeal). 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 requires the court to make a determination regarding each defendant’s 
bail status and enter an order designating the defendant’s custodial status under one of four categories: 
(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond; (2) 
released on a condition or combination of conditions; (3) temporarily detained to permit revocation 
of conditional release, deportation, or exclusion; or (4) detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) requires pretrial 
release on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond unless release on these conditions 
will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance, or will endanger community safety. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(c)(1)(B) requires imposition of the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions
necessary to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance and community safety. United States v. 
Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 354–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]the general expectation of the Bail 
Reform Act is that a defendant shall be released on his own recognizance or unsecured bond. . .”). 
81. Although the Bail Reform Act of 1984 permits the use of secured bonds and property
bonds, (see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(xi) & (xii) (release conditions may include execution of an 
agreement to forfeit property or money for a failure to appear or execution of a bail bond with “solvent 
sureties; who will execute an agreement to forfeit in such amount as is reasonably necessary to assure 
appearance of the person” )) the federal statutory scheme clearly favors release on personal 
recognizance or unsecured appearance bond. See id. 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (court may not impose any financial conditions of release that will 
result in the pretrial detention of a defendant). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 enumerates factors a 
court must consider in determining a defendant’s eligibility for pretrial release: (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense (in particular whether it is a violent offense or involves narcotics); (2) 
the weight of the evidence; (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics; and (4) the nature and 
seriousness of the danger that would be posed by the defendant’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). For a 
comprehensive discussion on the procedures and theories of pretrial release and detention, see United 
States v. Ailemen, 165 F.R.D. 571 (N. D. Cal. 1996). 
83. Appleman, supra note 66 at 1329–30 (“The difficulties of successfully implementing the
1966 Bail Reform Act, such as setting the terms of release and ensuring that conditions were met, 
along with worries about the crimes committed by defendants out on conditional release, led to the 
passage of the 1984 Bail Reform Act.”). 
84. 18 U.S.C. §3142(b), (f)(2)(B) (detention based wholly or in part on a determination of
dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence). 
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presumption of detention for defendants charged with certain enumerated 
offenses, including some crimes of violence and some drug crimes.85 
The constitutionality of the 1984 Act was challenged shortly after it 
was enacted, and a circuit split subsequently developed on whether the 
1984 Act’s preventive detention provisions violate substantive due 
process or the Eighth Amendment.86 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in United States v. Salerno to resolve the issue.87 In Salerno the 
lower court had held the 1984 Act facially invalid, concluding that pretrial 
detention based on future dangerousness was “repugnant to the concept of 
substantive due process which . . . prohibits the total deprivation of liberty 
simply as a means of preventing future crimes.”88 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that the 1984 Act “fully comports with constitutional 
requirements.”89 
In Salerno, the Court established two principles that continue to 
shape federal bail law. First, it held that pretrial detention is regulatory, 
not punitive. As such, the Court held, pretrial detention “does not 
constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process 
Clause.”90 Second, it rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment 
excessive bail prohibition contains an implicit right to bail. The fact that 
the Constitution prohibits excessive bail, the Court held, “says nothing 
about whether bail shall be available at all.”91 Rather, the Court read the 
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) sets out three categories of criminal offenses that give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the defendant or community safety if the defendant is released. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 
2d at 355 (“In cases involving crimes designated as violent, there is a rebuttable presumption that the 
defendant presents a danger to the community, . . . yet the burden of persuasion rests always with the 
Government.”) (citing United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
86. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
335, 355 (1990) (“Salerno involved two constitutional issues: whether pretrial detention under the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 violates the eighth amendment, and whether it violates the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Succinctly stated, preventive detention poses one core 
constitutional question: whether the Constitution permits jailing presumptively innocent persons to 
prevent them from committing future crimes without any showing that the jailed persons are mentally 
imbalanced.”). 
87. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
88. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1986). 
89. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. 
90. Id. at 748. See also, United States v. Ailemen, 165 F.R.D. 571, 579–80 (N. D. Cal. 1996) 
(“The interest that Salerno identified consists of ‘preventing danger to the community’ (protecting 
society from dangerous persons). Interests that other courts have identified include assuring that the 
defendant will not flee before trial and preventing the defendant from jeopardizing the trial process 
through acts such as threats against witnesses.”) (citations omitted). 
91. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752–53. Salerno traced the origin of the Eighth Amendment to the
English Bill of Rights Act which, the Court observed, “In England that clause has never thought to 
accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases 
where it is proper to grant bail.” Id. at 754 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952)). 
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excessive bail clause to provide that if bail is imposed, it may not be 
excessive, not a guarantee that bail must be made available.92 “[L]iberty,” 
the Court said “is the norm” and “detention prior to trial or without trial 
is the carefully limited exception,” and it concluded that the Bail Reform 
Act’s pretrial detention provisions fell squarely within that carefully 
limited exception.93 The Court expressed “no view as to the point at which 
detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and 
therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”94 It has yet 
to address the issue it left open in Salerno – at what point does pretrial 
detention cease being regulatory and become punitive?95 
4. Preventive Pretrial Detention under State Law
In right to bail states, trial courts have wide discretion to set 
conditions of release for defendants charged with bailable offenses. But 
they may not refuse to set bail for those defendants, even in the interest of 
public safety.96 In these jurisdictions, the defendant’s personal 
The Salerno Court reasoned “that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling 
interest other than prevention of flight . . . the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754–55. The petitioners in Carlson, the case Salerno quoted, it should be noted, 
were detained pursuant to immigration laws, which are administrative, not criminal laws. The 
language Salerno quoted from Carlson, thus, is dicta. Lower courts, however, understand the Court’s 
jurisprudence to permit pretrial detention without bail in criminal cases as long as detention is not 
imposed as punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-00046-GMN-PAL, 2017 WL 
3838032, at *8 (D. Nev. Sept. 1, 2017) (“[I]t is well settled that a defendant accused of committing a 
crime may be detained prior to a formal adjudication of guilt. . . . A defendant charged in a federal 
case who has had a bail hearing may be detained pending trial and subjected to ‘restrictions and 
conditions of the detention facility so long as those restrictions do not amount to punishment or 
otherwise violate the Constitution.’”) (citation omitted). 
92. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754–55 (Eighth Amendment does not grant absolute right to bail.).
Some dispute whether the historical record supports Salerno’s reading of the Eighth Amendment bail 
clause because it was not supported by citation to precedent or history. At least one writer has argued 
that Salerno failed to take into account the prevailing understanding of bail when the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted. See Hegreness, supra note 20, at 916–17. See also Verrilli, Jr., supra note 
31, at 360 (written while the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was under discussion and which argues that 
the eighth amendment bail clause should be read to guarantee the right to bail and to disallow 
preventive detention). 
93. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). See also United 
States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Risk of flight is not the exclusive basis 
for detaining an accused. The Bail Reform Act also instituted dangerousness as a basis for detention.”) 
(citing United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Jimenez, No. 
96-1705, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 37921 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 1996). 
94. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4. 
95. For an argument that contemporary pretrial detention practices often amount to
punishment-like conditions that should trigger Sixth Amendment protections, see Appleman, supra, 
note 66. 
96. The one exception to this categorical rule is a trial court’s ability to revoke bail for a
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characteristics (such as her propensity for violence or the likelihood that 
she will flee), the type of offense she is charged with, and the strength of 
the state’s evidence may be relevant to the type or amount of bail imposed, 
but they are irrelevant to whether she can be detained pretrial without 
bail.97 Bailability for noncapital offenses in a right to bail state is a 
categorical proposition—a defendant charged with anything other than a 
capital offense is bailable. In contrast, a defendant charged with a capital 
offense is not necessarily nonbailable—that defendant can only be 
detained pretrial without bail on a showing that the proof of the crime with 
which she is charged is “evident” and the presumption that she committed 
it is “great.”98 
Although most state constitutions originally provided a right to bail 
for most offenses, most states now authorize preventive pretrial detention 
without bail in a wide range of cases if a defendant presents a risk of flight 
or danger to the community.99 As of the drafting of this Article twenty-
defendant who violates conditions of release while free on bail. Although, technically, a defendant in 
a right to bail state could claim a continuing right to bailability following a revocation of bail, courts 
have interpreted bail revocation statutes to allow for pretrial detention without bail for defendants 
whose underlying bail has been revoked. LaFave, et al., supra note 58, at § 12.3(b) (“It is sometimes 
said that such conduct by the defendant constitutes a forfeiture of his previously-exercised right to 
bail, which doubtless is the proper conclusion in at least some circumstances.”) (citing Shabazz v. 
State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983) (although “the right to bail in a non-capital case” 
guaranteed by the state constitution is “absolute” and thus may not be denied by the state, it 
nonetheless possible that “an accused could forfeit his constitutional right to bail” by his affirmative 
conduct)). 
97. LaFave, et al., supra note 58, at § 12.3(b) (“Just as it seems to be generally conceded that
these right-to-bail provisions in the state constitutions foreclose denial of release to a defendant on 
the ground that no release conditions would suffice to ensure his appearance, it is likewise clear that 
they do not permit that broader variety of preventive detention authorized in the federal system-that 
is, detention based upon nothing more than a finding that a certain defendant charged with a serious 
offense would be dangerous to some other person or the community if released.”). 
98. Right to bail provisions do not specify what the “presumption” relates to; courts and
legislatures interpret it to mean a presumption that the defendant committed the crime charged. See 
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §135.240 (2)(a) (“When the defendant is charged with murder, aggravated murder 
or treason, release shall be denied when the proof is evident or the presumption strong that the person 
is guilty.”) (emphasis added); State v. Arthur, 390 So.2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1980) (“Simply to present the 
indictment or information is not sufficient. The state’s burden, in order to foreclose bail as a matter 
of right, is to present some further evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, 
would be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty.”). 
99. By way of example, the Arizona Constitution, as enacted, provided: “All persons charged
with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident 
or the presumption great.” ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. II, § 22ccc. It currently provides:  
All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except: 1. For cap-
ital offenses, sexual assault, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age or 
molestation of a child under fifteen years of age when the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great. 2. For felony offenses committed when the person charged is already admitted 
to bail on a separate felony charge and where the proof is evident or the presumption great 
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states, fewer than half, retain a constitutional right to bail by sufficient 
sureties for the vast majority of noncapital offenses. Alabama,100 
Alaska,101 Arkansas,102 Connecticut,103 Delaware,104 Idaho,105 Indiana,106 
as to the present charge. 3. For felony offenses if the person charged poses a substantial 
danger to any other person or the community, if no conditions of release which may be 
imposed will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community and if the 
proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge. 4. For serious felony 
offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in 
the United States illegally and if the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the 
present charge.  
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22. Further by way of example, the Constitution of Utah, as enacted, provided: 
“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is 
evident or the presumption strong.” UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. I, § 8. It currently provides:  
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except: (a) persons charged with a 
capital offense when there is substantial evidence to support the charge; or (b) persons 
charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on 
a previous felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or (c) persons charged with a crime, designated by statute as one for which bail 
may be denied, if there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to any 
other person or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released 
on bail.  
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 100.  ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. I, § 16 (“That all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable 
by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption 
great[.]”). 
 101.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the 
right . . . to be released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the 
presumption great[.]”). 
 102.  ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 103.  CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right . . . 
to be released on bail upon sufficient security, except in capital offenses, where the proof is evident 
or the presumption great[.]”). 
 104.  DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for 
capital offenses when the proof is positive or the presumption great[.]”). 
 105.  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 106.  IND. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Offenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by 
sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the 
presumption strong.”). 
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Iowa,107 Kansas,108 Kentucky,109 Maine,110 Minnesota,111 Montana,112 
Nebraska,113 Nevada,114 North Dakota,115 Oregon,116, South Dakota,117 
Tennessee,118 and Wyoming.119 In these states, defendants can be denied 
bail only for capital offenses, or other serious offenses, like murder, 
treason, or offenses punishable by life. 120 And, even then, bail can only 
 107.  IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12 (“All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable, by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offences where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”). 
 108.  KAN. CONST. B. of R. § 9 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for 
capital offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 109.  KY. CONST. § 16 (“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for capital 
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great[.]”). 
 110.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person before conviction shall be bailable for any of the 
crimes which now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of the 
Constitution, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, whatever the punishment of the 
crimes may be.”). Maine’s Supreme Court interprets this provision to provide for an absolute right to 
bail for non-excepted offenses. See Fredette v. State, 428 A.2d 395, 405 (Me. 1981) (an “accused’s 
right to be admitted to bail [is] . . . absolute in regard to all but a few crimes, and as to these few, the 
right [is] . . . conditional, i.e., the right exists if there is absent “proof . . . evident or . . . presumption 
great”). 
 111.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“All persons before conviction shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 112.  MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 113.  NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
treason, sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim, and murder, 
where the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). Although Nebraska’s Constitution creates an 
exception to the right to bail for non-capital offenses other than murder or treason, it is included here 
as a constitutional right to bail state because in Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981) a federal 
court held the portion of this section denying bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses is 
an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. But 
see Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), vacating and remanding Hunt v. Roth for mootness. 
 114.  NEV. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties; unless for 
Capital Offenses or murders punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of parole when the 
proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 115.  N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for 
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 116.  OR. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Offences [sic], except murder, and treason, shall be bailable by 
sufficient sureties. Murder or treason, shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the 
presumption strong.”). 
 117.  S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses when proof is evident or presumption great.”). 
 118.  TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“That all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless 
for capital offences, when the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”). 
 119.  WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). 
 120.  Rhode Island recognizes a right to bail similar to the states listed above, however, its 
constitution creates an exception for serious drug offenses as well, and it, therefore, is not counted 
here as a traditional right to bail state. See R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (“All persons imprisoned ought to 
be bailed by sufficient surety, unless for offenses punishable by imprisonment for life, or for offenses 
involving the use or threat or use of a dangerous weapon by one already convicted of such offense or 
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be denied only if the proof of the offense is “evident” or “positive” and 
the presumption that the defendant committed it is “great” or “strong.” 
The critical point of departure in bail administration is whether a 
state recognizes an absolute constitutional right to bail for noncapital 
offenses or whether it authorizes pretrial detention of noncapital 
defendants without bail based on future dangerousness. Sometimes state 
statutes and rules make that line less than clear. In 2012, for example, two 
separate scholarly articles asserted that either forty-five or forty-six states 
and the District of Columbia authorize denial of pretrial release based on 
dangerousness.121 Included in that count were twelve states whose 
constitutions guarantee a right to bail by sufficient sureties in most 
noncapital cases – Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
and Tennessee.122 It appears that these states were considered preventive 
already convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for life, or for offenses involving the 
unlawful sale, distribution, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, 
distribute or deliver any controlled substance or by possession of a controlled substance punishable 
by imprisonment for ten (10) years or more, when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption 
great.”). Rhode Island’s Supreme Court interprets this section to remove serious drug offenses from 
the category of bailable offenses based on the defendant’s potential dangerousness, which leaves an 
absolute right to bail intact for other offenses not specifically categorized as nonbailable. Witt v. 
Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 264 (R.I. 1990) (“no absolute right to bail exists in Rhode Island for defendants 
charged with the delivery of a controlled substance when the proof of guilt is evident or the 
presumption great[.]”). 
 121.  See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
497, 507–08 (2012) (stating that “[t]o date, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted laws permitting courts to either detain or conditionally release defendants determined to be 
dangerous” and asserting that “forty-six jurisdictions . . . allow pretrial detention of dangerous 
defendants”) and Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands, supra note 66, at 1330 (“Most states have 
followed the path of the BRA, with forty-five states and the District of Columbia specifically 
permitting the determination of dangerousness as a predicate for denying pretrial release.”).  
 122.  Baradaran and McIntyre list these states as among forty-six “allow[ing] pretrial detention 
of dangerous defendants.” Supra, note 121. The laws of these twelve states, however, do not authorize 
preventive pretrial detention without bail for bailable offenses. See supra notes 100–121. See also 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64(a) (specifying conditions of release for bailable offenses, taking into 
consideration risk of flight and dangerousness); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (court must release 
on nonfinancial conditions for bailable offenses unless defendant presents risk of flight or 
dangerousness; in that event, court “shall permit the release of the defendant upon the furnishing of 
surety satisfactory to the court in an amount to be determined by the court.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
19-2903 (“Any person charged with a crime who is not released on his own recognizance is entitled 
to bail, as a matter of right, before a plea or verdict of guilty, except when the offense charged is 
punishable by death and the proof is evident or the presumption is great.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-
8-4(a) (court must order “the amount in which a person charged by an indictment or information is to 
be held to bail” and making no allowance for denial of bail based on dangerousness); MINN. CONST. 
art. I, § 7 (“All persons before conviction shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital 
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”) and MINN. ST. ANN. § 629.53; Minn. 
R. Crim. P. 6.02 (listing conditions of release; no provision for detention without bail for bailable 
offenses); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.01 (court to consider what “condition or conditions of release 
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detention states because their statutory laws and rules either (1) permit 
trial courts to consider danger to the community in setting bail for bailable 
offenses, or (2) authorize pretrial detention without bail for defendants 
charged with capital offenses if they are determined to be dangerous. It is 
accurate that many right to bail states, by rule or statute, permit trial courts 
to consider potential danger to the community in setting conditions of 
release, including the amount of bail. But this does not mean that they 
authorize detention of defendants charged with bailable offense without 
bail based on a finding of future dangerousness. It means only that the 
trial court can take these factors into consideration in deciding what 
conditions of release are appropriate. Further, it is accurate that the states 
listed authorize preventive pretrial detention of capital defendants without 
bail if they are determined to be dangerous. This limited authority to 
detain a small segment of defendants for a narrow category of crimes such 
as capital offenses, murder, and treason, however, does not translate to a 
generalized power to deny pretrial release based on dangerousness for 
other defendants. All states that have capital crimes, in fact, authorize 
pretrial detention without bail of capital defendants under some 
circumstances. Thus, the power to potentially detain capital defendants or 
those charged with murder, treason, or crimes that carry a life sentence 
without bail is not a distinguishing feature in bail administration. The 
dividing line in bail administration is whether a jurisdiction recognizes an 
absolute right to bail for the majority of noncapital offenses, or whether it 
allows preventive pretrial detention without bail for a wide range of 
noncapital offenses. In identifying which side of that line a state falls on, 
shall reasonably assure appearance and deter possible threats to the safety and maintenance of 
evidence or the safety of victims, witnesses, or other persons in the community”); NEV. R. STAT. ANN. 
§ 178.484 (“Right to bail before conviction; exceptions; imposition of conditions; arrest for violation 
of condition. (l) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person arrested for an offense other 
than murder of the first degree must be admitted to bail . . . (11) Before releasing a person arrested 
for any crime, the court may impose such reasonable conditions on the person as it deems necessary 
to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community and to ensure that the person will appear at 
all times and places ordered by the court[.]”); N.D. R. Crim. P. 46 (purpose of bail is to assure 
appearance defendant and listing release condition factors for bailable offenses); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §135.240 (“When the defendant is charged with murder, aggravated murder or treason, release 
shall be denied when the proof is evident or the presumption strong that the person is guilty. When 
the defendant is charged with murder or aggravated murder and the proof is not evident nor the 
presumption strong that the defendant is guilty, the court shall determine the issue of release as 
provided [in the statute].”); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-13-1 (“Every person who is held on any 
criminal process to answer to any indictment, information, or complaint against him or her shall be 
released upon giving recognizance with sufficient surety or sureties[.]”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
43-3 (conditions of release for bailable offenses if release without bail will not reasonably assure the 
appearance of the defendant); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-11-105 (“When the defendant has been arrested 
or held to answer for any bailable offense, the defendant is entitled to be admitted to bail[.]”). 
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a state’s statutory law cannot be considered in isolation from its 
constitution. 
III. BAIL BONDING AND THE ROLE AND REGULATION OF THE
BONDSMAN 
In common law England, under the bot system, a surety was typically 
a friend, employer or relative. The American innovation on bail by surety 
is the introduction of commercial sureties who charge the accused a non-
refundable fee to post bail on his behalf.123 This type of financial 
arrangement is outlawed in many nations. And it is explicitly legal in only 
one other country besides the United States—the Philippines.124 The 
commercial bail bond industry in the United States originated in frontier 
America—San Francisco in the late 1800s where the “absence of close 
friends and extended family made it difficult to find people willing to put 
up bail money[.]”125 Peter and Thomas McDonough, brothers who 
worked as bartenders in their father’s saloon, started “putting up bail 
money as a favor to lawyers who drank [there]. . . . Once the lawyers’ 
clients showed up for court, the brothers got their money back.”126 The 
 123.  See Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html [https://perma.cc/9GBK-A2RF] (“‘It’s a 
very American invention,’ John Goldkamp, a professor of criminal justice at Temple University, said 
of the commercial bail bond system. ‘It’s really the only place in the criminal justice system where a 
liberty decision is governed by a profit-making businessman who will or will not take your 
business.’”).  
 124.  Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry: How $550 
and a Five-day Class Gets You the Right to Stalk, Arrest, and Shoot People, MOTHER JONES (May–
June 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/bail-bond-prison-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/QXH6-R4A5] (“The potential for abuse is a major reason why commercial bail never caught 
on worldwide. The only other country that allows someone to make a profit off bail is the Philippines. 
In Canada, selling bail bonds can earn you two years in prison on a charge equivalent to bribing a 
juror. In Australia, a government commission rejected the idea of introducing commercial bail in part 
because ‘it lends itself to abuses such as collusive ties between bondsmen and organized crime or 
police, lawyers, and court officials.’”); Liptak, supra note 123 (“[P]osting bail for people accused of 
crimes in exchange for a fee, is all but unknown in the rest of the world. In England, Canada and other 
countries, agreeing to pay a defendant’s bond in exchange for money is a crime akin to witness 
tampering or bribing a juror — a form of obstruction of justice”); Id. (“The rest of the world considers 
the American system a warning of how not to set up a pretrial release system, F. E. Devine wrote in 
Commercial Bail Bonding, a 1991 book that remains the only comprehensive international survey of 
the subject. He said that courts in Australia, India and South Africa had disciplined lawyers for 
professional misconduct for setting up commercial bail arrangements.”). 
 125.  Bauer, supra note 124; Liptak, supra note 123 (“America’s open frontier and 
entrepreneurial spirit injected an innovation into the process: by the early 1800s, private businesses 
were allowed to post bail in exchange for payments from the defendants and the promise that they 
would hunt down the defendants and return them if they failed to appear.”). 
126.  Bauer, supra note 124. 
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brothers eventually started charging a fee for this service, and so began 
the commercial bail bond business in the United States127 By the 1940s, 
commercial bail bonds had become an established part of the American 
criminal justice system.128 As of the drafting of this article, commercial, 
for-profit bail bonding is legal in all but four states—Illinois, Kentucky, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin.129 
Where commercial bail bonding is available, a defendant who does 
not have access to sufficient resources to post bail in cash can seek help 
from a bondsman, also known as a bail agent.130 Although a defendant 
may be entitled to have a court set bail in right to bail states, he is not 
entitled to the bondsman’s services—defendants deemed a risk by a 
bondsman can be turned down. In jurisdictions that authorize money-bail 
as a standard condition of pretrial release, secured money-bail is more 
heavily employed than other condition of release, including release on the 
defendant’s personal or own recognizance.131 Thus, where used, secured 
money-bail can often become the default release mechanism, and setting 
the amount of bail then becomes the focus of pretrial detention decisions. 
“Bail” and “bond” are distinct concepts that are sometimes conflated 
or confused. Legally, “bail” describes a “situation in which one holds 
something or someone for another.”132 In popular usage, it “has come to 
connote the process of getting out” of jail.133 Unless a defendant is not 
 127.  The company was called McDonough Bros. It was described by a contemporaneous news 
account as the “most notorious business house in San Francisco” and became known as the “Old Lady 
of Kearny Street.”  Bauer, supra note 124. “The Old Lady ‘furnished bail by the gross to bookmakers 
and prostitutes, kept a taxi waiting at the door to whisk them out of jail and back to work.’”. 
128.  Bauer, supra note 124. 
 129.  See Cliff Collins, The Question of Commercial Bail: Bail Industry Wants Oregon to Return 
to a System It Once Rejected, 75 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17 (2014) (noting that forty-six states still use a 
commercial bail system) (citing Oregon Laws 1973 c.836 § 146); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510(1) 
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of bail bondsman . . . or to otherwise 
for compensation or other consideration: (a) Furnish bail or funds or property to serve as bail; or (b) 
Make bonds or enter into undertakings as surety; for the appearance of persons charged with any 
criminal offense or violation of law or ordinance punishable by fine, imprisonment or death[.]); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 969.12 (“No surety under this chapter may be compensated for acting as such a 
surety.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-7 (providing that bail is to be deposited, in a percentage or the 
full amount, directly with the clerk of court). 
130.  Typically, a bondsman charges a defendant a non-refundable 10 percent fee and the surety 
charges the bondsman 10 percent of that—so “for every $1,000 bond, the bondsman gets $100 and 
gives $10 to the surety.” Bauer, supra note 124. 
 131.  Brian R. Johnson & Ruth S. Stevens, The Regulation and Control of Bail Recovery Agents: 
An Exploratory Study, 38(2) CRIM. JUST. REV. 190 (2013) (citing Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. 
Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP. 
(2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5A3-2P3D]. 
132.  GOLDFARB, supra note 4, at 6. 
133.  GOLDFARB, supra note 4, at 6. 
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bailable, following arrest, a court sets the conditions of her pretrial release. 
Conditions of release may have non-monetary and monetary components. 
Universal non-financial conditions of release include requiring the 
defendant to promise to appear when ordered to do so by a court with 
jurisdiction over her and to not commit offenses while on release. In 
modern bail administration, other non-monetary pretrial release 
conditions may include submitting to electronic monitoring, alcohol or 
drug testing, abiding by orders of protection, or attending counseling. 
A “bond” is a promise to appear (or to procure the defendant’s 
appearance) at future court hearings. A bond can be either secured or 
unsecured. An unsecured bond is one that is backed by the defendant’s 
written promise alone to appear in court or pay the bail amount if he 
doesn’t (also called a “personal bond” or “unsecured appearance bond”). 
A defendant whose pretrial release is not conditioned on posting money 
or property as security is released on her “own recognizance” (also 
“personal recognizance”)—i.e. her own promise to appear unsecured by 
any collateral. A secured bond is one that is backed by the deposit or 
encumbrance of money or property with the court, or backed by a third 
party promise to pay the bail amount should the defendant fail to appear. 
Many jurisdictions have published bail schedules that set fixed bail 
amounts for specific offenses. Some jurisdictions authorize detention 
facilities or law enforcement officers to release defendants who post bail 
in the amount listed on the bail schedule without having to first appear 
before a judicial officer. 
There are several types of secured money-bail bonds, including cash 
bonds, deposit bonds, and property bonds. Cash bonds (also called “all-
cash bonds”) are secured by depositing the full amount of bail with the 
court. An important point of departure among jurisdictions that recognize 
a right to bail by sufficient sureties is whether a trial court can require a 
defendant to post the entire amount of his bail in cash (“cash only” bail), 
or whether a defendant must be given the opportunity to finance a secured 
bail bond through a commercial bondsman. This issue goes deep to the 
heart of a state’s bail administration philosophy. State courts that permit 
“cash only” bail do so on the ground that the purpose of bail is to ensure 
the defendant’s presence at trial, and that the right to bail does not include 
a right to access release on less than the full amount of bail in cash by 
means of a secured bail bond.134 State courts that prohibit “cash only” bail 
 134.  See Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 778 (Wyo. 2015) (“cash only” bond 
constitutionally permissible because purpose of bail in Wyoming is to ensure defendant’s presence to 
answer the charges without excessively restricting his liberty pending trial; noting split in other states 
“regarding the definition of ‘sufficient sureties.’”); Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 805–06 (Ark. 
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identify the purpose of bail as protecting the defendant’s pretrial liberty 
interest, and hold that denying him the ability to secure his pretrial release 
by use of a surety runs contrary to that constitutional policy.135 
Property bonds are secured by encumbering real or personal 
property. A property bond gives the court a lien on property in the amount 
of bail. Deposit bonds require deposit of just a percentage of the bail 
amount directly with the court, with the full bail amount due should by 
the defendant fail to appear. If a court orders a secured money-bail bond 
and a defendant does not have enough cash or property to put up as 
collateral to meet bail, the defendant must find someone else who will 
promise to pay the court the full amount of bail if the defendant fails to 
appear. In the bail context, this third party guarantor is a “surety” who 
agrees to finance or secure a bail bond on behalf of the defendant, and the 
defendant is the surety’s principal.136 
A surety bond is the guarantor’s promise to the court to produce the 
principal or meet the principal’s financial obligation to the court if the 
principal fails to meet the court’s conditions of release.137 The surety for 
a bail bond can be someone with a personal connection to the defendant, 
such as a friend, employer, or relative. It can also be a nonprofit 
organization. In most states, the surety can also be a commercial for-profit 
2016) (purpose of bail is to ensure presence of defendant); Ex parte Singleton, 902 So. 2d 132 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2004) (cash-only bail does not violate state constitution); Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Fullerton v. County Court, 124 P.3d 866 (Colo. App. 2005) (same); 
State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003) (same); State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2012) 
(same); State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (same).  
 135.  See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 59 (Wash. 2014) (purpose of bail is to protect the accused; 
state constitution guarantees those accused of bailable offenses the right to access bail by sufficient 
sureties); State v. Golden, 546 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (cash-only bail violates state 
constitution); State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Minn. 2000) (state constitutional right to bail 
by “sufficient sureties . . . is unambiguous and . . . prohibits cash only bail”); Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. 
General Sessions Court of Madison Cnty., No. C–97–62, 1997 WL 711137 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
1997) (cash only bail unconstitutional under state constitution); Smith v. Leis, 835 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 
2005); State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 875 (Vt. 2006) (cash only bail violates state constitutional right 
to be “bailable by sufficient sureties;” option of bail bond or deposit of cash in lieu thereof belongs to 
defendant). 
 136.  A “surety” can be both a “[a] person who is primarily liable for paying another’s debt or 
performing another’s obligation” and “[a] formal assurance; esp[ecially] a pledge, bond, guarantee, 
or security given for the fulfillment of an undertaking.” Black’s Law Dictionary (2000 ed.). 
 137.  See Saunders, 344 P.3d at 778 (“One who is bound with and for another who is primarily 
liable, and who is called the principal; one who enters into a bond or recognizance to answer for the 
appearance of another in court, or for his payment of a debt, or for the performance of some act, and 
who, in case of the failure of the principal, is liable to pay the debt and damages; a bondsman, a 
bail . . . other definitions of ‘surety’ . . . [can] include . . . ‘[s]ecurity against loss or damage; security 
for payment or for the performance of some act.’”) (citing surety AM. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY 
(1895); surety CENTURY DICTIONARY (1895); and surety, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1895)). 
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entity, a business that provides surety bail bonds in exchange for a fee. In 
jurisdictions that permit commercial bail bonding,138 the surety is 
typically an insurance company acting through an agent, typically a bail 
bondsman. If a bail bondsman determines the defendant is bail-worthy, 
the bondsman provides the court a secured bail bond, which represents a 
commitment to ensure the defendant’s presence at future hearings and to 
pay the defendant’s bail should the defendant fail to appear. In return for 
this service, the bondsman charges the defendant a nonrefundable fee and 
requires the defendant to sign a contract, which often includes promises 
to submit to conditions in addition to those imposed by the court. If the 
defendant violates the terms of his contract with the bondsman, in most 
jurisdictions the bondsman, or the bondsman’s agent, can apprehend the 
defendant and deliver him to jail. 
Bail bondsmen typically are not the actual surety (or guarantor) of a 
bail bond. Rather, bondsmen usually obtain policies from large insurance 
companies139 to cover losses occasioned by defendants who abscond.140 
Where this is the arrangement, the bondsman is acting as an agent for the 
surety, not as the surety itself.141 The insurance company makes money 
by charging the bondsman a percentage of the bond fees the bondsman 
collects from defendants.142 If the defendant fails to appear and fails to 
pay his bail, and the bondsman does not pay the defendant’s bail, the court 
can look to the surety company for payment.143 
138.  Four states prohibit commercial bail bonding. See Collins, supra note 129.  
 139.  An example of a large insurance company that specializes in cash bail is Crum & Forster 
Insurance, a subsidiary of a Toronto-based international conglomerate, Fairfax Financial Holdings 
Limited. See Kim, supra note 73.  
140.  Id. (“Bail is similar to homeowners’ or auto insurance, [if] . . . the judge sets your bail at 
$10,000 . . . in most states, you would pay 10 percent to 15 percent of that bond amount as a premium. 
In return, the bond agent is guaranteeing the court that should you fail to appear and the bail agent 
failed to produce you, they would pay the court that $10,000. . . [T]he ‘premiums’ paid by defendants 
cover the fees that bail agents themselves pay to large insurance companies to guarantee payment on 
a bail bond. If somebody jumps bail, a bondsman calls on his insurer . . . [b]ondsmen are essentially 
brokers for these bigger firms.”). 
 141.  Id. (“The website of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States includes a page titled 
‘How to Become a Bail Agent.’ Half of the text is about choosing an insurance company to back your 
bail bonds. . . .”). 
 142.  Id. (“The profit a bondsman makes is the difference between the premiums charged to a 
defendant and the premiums the bondsman has to pay the insurance company. That gives bondsmen 
an incentive to ensure that their clients show up in court: forfeiting a bond would have the same effect 
on their insurance as totaling a car. . . . But the biggest ‘risk’ bondsmen seem to assess is whether 
defendants can pay their premiums.”).  
 143.  State laws typically require notice to the surety and bond agent of the forfeiture and provide 
for a grace period to produce the defendant or provide a legitimate reason (often designated by statute) 
why the defendant cannot be brought before the court. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-70 (West 
2019). For a collection of state bail forfeiture laws, current as of 2013, see Bail Forfeiture Procedures, 
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Commercial bail bondsmen make a profit by collecting a non-
refundable fee in exchange for providing a bond to secure the defendant’s 
release. The amount of the fee may or may not be regulated by the state, 
and it is typically 10% of the bail amount.144 The fee is not returned even 
if the defendant is acquitted or the charges against her are dropped. Some 
bond agents may offer defendants an opportunity to finance bail, called a 
“credit bond,” a practice that does not appear to be regulated in many 
jurisdictions.145 Although bail agents may function as creditors, they have 
far more leeway in collecting debt than other creditors, including the 
power to impose restrictions on a defendant’s movements and the power 
to arrest defendants.146 
The bail bond market is lucrative and the industry is organized. 
According to one source, at least 32 surety companies underwrite bail in 
the United States, and they collectively underwrote approximately $14 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (June 28, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/bail-forfeiture-procedures.aspx [https://perma.cc/VGX4-UWF7] (note that this source was last 
updated in 2013 and may be outdated). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(e) (“[i]f there is a breach of 
condition of a bond, the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.”). 
 144.  See Kim, supra note 73 (“[S]ome states, like Maryland, cap premiums at a fixed 
percentage, other states also set a minimum amount, eliminating room for price competition. In 
Virginia, for example, state law requires that bail bondsmen ‘shall not charge a bail bond premium 
less than 10 percent or more than 15 percent of the amount of the bond.’ Some states have also passed 
laws requiring judges to set money bail for certain kinds of offenses, such as domestic violence, 
thereby foreclosing judges from other options, such as release on personal recognizance.”). 
 145.  Lysée Mitri, Bail Bond Assoc., Lawmakers Sue Supreme Court for Pre-detention Rules, 
KRQE (July 28, 2017, 10:16 PM), http://krqe.com/2017/07/28/bail-bond-assoc-lawmakers-sue-
supreme-court-for-pre-detention-rules/ [https://perma.cc/V9BF-S55X] (“A credit bond allows a 
defendant to pay a large amount owed to the bonding company in small weekly installments, a practice 
the local criminal court judges have sought to more tightly regulate. When a judge issues a bond for 
a defendant awaiting trial, that defendant has two options — either pay the full amount to the criminal 
court and then get it back after showing up for trial; or, if the defendant can’t come up with the full 
bond amount, he or she can pay 10 percent of that amount to a bonding company, who will then be 
responsible for paying the bond in full if the defendant fails to show up to court. Credit bonds are an 
increasingly common way of doing business, particularly since it gives one bonding company a 
competitive edge over another in the eyes of a client, and because bond amounts continue to rise 
across the country.”). 
 146.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Shaila Dewan, When Bail Feels Less Like Freedom, More 
Like Extortion, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/bail-bonds-
extortion.html [https://perma.cc/F7MH-Q3DS] (“bond agents have become the payday lenders of the 
criminal justice world . . . When clients . . . cannot afford to pay the bond company’s fee to get them 
out, bond agents simply loan them the money, allowing them to go on a payment plan. But bondsmen 
have extraordinary powers that most lenders do not. . . . [S]ome states give them broad latitude to 
arrest their clients for any reason — or none at all. A credit card company cannot jail someone for 
missing a payment. A bondsman, in many instances, can. Using that leverage, bond agents can charge 
steep fees, some of which are illegal, with impunity[.] . . . They can also go far beyond the demands 
of other creditors by requiring their clients to check in regularly, keep a curfew, allow searches of 
their car or home at any time, and open their medical, Social Security and phone records to 
inspection.”). 
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billion worth of bail bonds in 2012.147 Unlike other forms of insurance, 
bail surety is virtually a no-risk business—“[p]roperty and auto insurance 
companies typically pay out 40 to 60 percent of their revenue in losses . . . 
the financial records of [the] 32 surety companies [referenced above] . . . 
cumulatively paid less than 1 percent in bail losses.”148 It is this 
intersection of insurance regulation and criminal justice, and the nature of 
the commercial surety market that distinguishes bail administration in the 
United States from pretrial release and detention practices in the rest of 
the world. 
To the extent states monitor the bail bond industry at all, primary 
responsibility for regulating and supervising the commercial bail bond 
industry typically falls to a state’s insurance commissioner, not the courts 
or any arm of the criminal justice system.149 The qualifications required 
to become a bail bondsman (also called commercial bond agent) vary 
among states. A commercial money-bail system may include private “bail 
recovery agents” (also called bail enforcement agents, bounty hunters, 
runners, solicitors, surety recovery agents, or bail bond enforcers) who are 
in the business of attempting to locate and recover absconded defendants 
for bail bond agencies.150 This is an under-examined151 and often loosely-
 147.  See Kim, supra note 73 (“No one really knows how big the commercial bail bond industry 
is in the United States. Some of the nation’s largest bail bond insurers are either foreign owned, such 
as Crum & Forster, or privately held, such as the American Surety Company, whose president is also 
chairman of the American Bail Coalition. A 2012 study by the Justice Policy Institute estimated that 
the industry writes roughly $14 billion in bail bonds per year, and the Professional Bail Agents of the 
United States says that there are about 14,000 bail agents nationwide.”).  
 148.  Bauer, supra note 124. See also Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146 (“The 
system . . . has worked well for the industry, even attracting private equity investors. Mom-and-pop 
bail companies are backed by large surety companies, which guarantee the full amount of the bond in 
exchange for a portion of the premium. Together, the surety companies and the bail bond agents 
collect about $2 billion a year in revenue. . . . While most insurance companies expect losses of up to 
50 percent, one surety company, Continental Heritage of Florida, had no losses in its bail division for 
almost two decades. And an industry giant, AIA Bail Bond Insurance Company, said it underwrote 
more than $800 billion in bonds in 2016. Its losses: zero.”). 
 149.  Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146 (“Bond companies fall into a sort of regulatory 
gulf between criminal courts and state insurance departments, which are supposed to regulate them 
but seldom impose sanctions. With rare exception, defense lawyers and prosecutors are too busy with 
their caseloads to keep bond companies in line. Further complicating things, it is often unclear whether 
consumer protection laws apply, and insurance departments say they lack the resources to investigate 
complaints.”).  
150.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 195. 
 151.  Appleman, supra note 66, at 1308–09 (“[F]inancial liability [for bail forfeiture] has led to 
many bondsmen employing recovery agents, usually known as bounty hunters, to ensure that . . . 
indicted defendants appear for their court dates. The last time the Supreme Court addressed the role 
of bounty hunters and bondsmen-one hundred and fifty years ago-it acknowledged the historical 
common law privileges of both bondsmen and bounty hunters, holding that the right to apprehend a 
fleeing defendant originates from the contract relationship between bondsmen and their clients. 
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regulated practice.152 Some commercial bail jurisdictions authorize 
licensed bail agents who write bonds to also apprehend defendants who 
abscond, but prohibit independent bail recovery agents.153 Some 
jurisdictions that permit bail recovery agents to operate require them to be 
licensed,154 others regulate the practice, but don’t require a license.155 
Some states do not regulate bail recovery agents at all.156 
IV. CONTEMPORARY BAIL REFORM - DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN.
SORT OF. 
The 1960s saw a national effort to reform the bail system in the 
United States. In 1961, Louis Schweitzer and Herbert Sturz founded the 
Vera Institute of Justice to bring attention to the large number of 
defendants who were being detained pretrial because they could not afford 
money-bail.157 The Vera Institute created the Manhattan Bail Project, 
which assessed the risk that pretrial defendants would fail to appear at 
future hearings in the absence of money-bail bonds. Based on interviews 
Despite vast changes in both criminal law and procedure, however, the Court has not addressed the 
topic since.”). 
 152.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 191 (“Currently, some states are engaged in a variety 
of legislative activities related to the licensing and regulation of bounty hunters. . . . In contrast, other 
states are eliminating or vetoing bail recovery legislation. For example, California, which had first 
enacted legislation requiring the certification and training of bounty hunters in 1999, allowed the 
provisions to lapse in 2010 through the operation of a sunset clause. As a result, there are currently 
no established standards for bounty hunters in that state; age, criminal background limitations, and 
training requirements for bounty hunters in California are no longer in effect. Meanwhile, in 
Wisconsin, a state where the surety bail system has been banned since 1979, the legislature included 
a provision in its 2011 budget bill that would have reintroduced the commercial bail industry and 
allowed bounty hunters to operate in that state. However, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker vetoed 
this section of the budget bill.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 153.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 196 (Arkansas, Florida, Ohio and Texas allow 
licensed bail agents to apprehend defendants, but prohibit independent bail recovery agents). 
 154.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 198 (Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington require bail recovery 
agents to obtain a license, but have varying age, continuing education, and criminal history 
disqualification requirements). 
 155.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 199 (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia require bail recovery agents to register, but do not require them to be 
licensed. These states have varying age, continuing education, and criminal history disqualification 
requirements). 
 156.  Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 200 (Eighteen states —Alabama, Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming do not regulate the 
qualifications of bail recovery agents, although at least one —Idaho —makes bail agents responsible 
for contractors and employees acting on their behalf (citing Idaho Code § 41-1045)). 
157.  SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
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with defendants, and using individualized information, the Project made 
specific release recommendations to judges.158 The centerpiece of the 
Project was release on the defendant’s promise to appear at future court 
proceedings—defendants deemed to pose little risk of flight were released 
on written promises to appear without posting a money bond.159 By the 
third year the Project was running, only a small fraction (less than two 
percent) of defendants who were released without having to post money-
bail failed to appear.”160 Other cities undertook similar projects, setting in 
motion the first round of bail reform in the United States. By 1965, around 
the same time Congress overhauled federal bail administration,161 fifty-
six local jurisdictions had instituted bail projects modeled after the 
Manhattan Bail Project, and New Jersey and Connecticut had established 
similar statewide projects.162 
Washington D.C. is often pointed to as a jurisdiction at the leading 
edge of money-bail reform.163 In 1994, in the middle of a crime wave, 
D.C. amended its Code using language based on the federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1984. The amendments to D.C.’s Code expressly authorized 
preventive pretrial detention in cases involving serious or violent 
offenses,164 following an adversarial hearing, at which the defendant is 
entitled to counsel.165 Prior to the 1994 amendments, D.C. courts used 
unpayable bail to immobilize high-risk defendants, despite a prohibition 
in its Code on the use of money-bail to secure a defendant’s detention.166 
Although preventive detention without bail is authorized under D.C.’s 
current Code, it is rarely used in misdemeanor cases—defendants are 
158.  SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
159.  SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
160.  SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
161.  The federal act “led to parallel reforms of bail in the states. Twenty states created a 
presumption toward release on recognizance in bailable categories.” Metzmeier, Preventive 
Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, Canada and Other 
Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 399, 408 n. 45 (1996). 
162.  SCHNACKE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
 163.  Ann E. Marimow, When It Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s 
Way, WASH. POST, (July 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-
comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-
b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.3ca239fcd17d [https://perma.cc/9PXK-5B99] (“This is 
not how the system works for those charged in almost every other local and state court in the country. 
But it is how the District has run its rough-and-tumble courthouse for more than two decades.”).  
164.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(c)(3).  
165.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)-(d)(7) (West 2017). 
166.  ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1078 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (citing testimony 
of Jude Truman Morrison of the D.C. Superior Court: “[I]n cases of any seriousness, judges made an 
effort nontransparently, never saying what they were doing out loud, to immobilize high-risk 
people . . . with money bonds that they hoped would be beyond their reach.”). 
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detained pretrial without bail in only approximately 1.5 percent of those 
cases.167 Although secured money-bail is still authorized under the D.C. 
Code, it is rarely used.168 
Bail reform can be voluntary or involuntary. Some jurisdictions have 
voluntarily pursued bail reform by amending their laws or court rules to 
explicitly authorize preventive pretrial detention, and to encourage or 
require pretrial release on non-financial conditions whenever possible. 
Other jurisdictions have changed their bail administration practices as a 
result of litigation and federal court intervention. States that have 
voluntarily changed their laws recently to minimize the use of money-bail, 
and to encourage or require pretrial release on non-financial conditions 
include New Mexico,169 New Jersey,170 Colorado,171 Illinois,172 and 
Maryland.173 Municipalities voluntarily pursing money-bail reform 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id.  
169.  In 2016, by constitutional amendment, New Mexico voters codified into state law a 2014 
decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court holding that setting high bail for the purposes of 
preventing pretrial release violated the state constitution and the state’s rules of criminal procedure. 
See State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2016); see also Herring, supra note 73 (In 2016, New 
Mexico “joined an increasing number of U.S. jurisdictions that have begun to implement risk-based 
systems of pre-trial detention as a potentially fairer and more effective alternative to traditional money 
bail. . . . In recent years, dozens of cities and states throughout the country have begun to explore risk-
based alternatives to bail. . . . Municipal courts in 50 cities in Alabama have adopted similar 
reforms . . . .”).  
 170.  Issie Lapowsky, One State’s Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls of Tech-Driven 
Justice, WIRED, (Sep. 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reform-tech-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KBR-JPS7] (New Jersey’s “Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act, which went into 
effect on January 1 [2017] and is designed to virtually eliminate bail in the state. Of all of the attempts 
to curb the use of bail nationwide, New Jersey’s approach is perhaps the most audacious.”); see also 
State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 7 (2017) (explaining New Jersey’s new pretrial detention system, 
which only allows money bail as a last resort and which “outlines a hierarchy of release decisions to 
assure a defendant’s return to court and protect both public safety and the integrity of the criminal 
justice process . . . .”). 
 171.  Jon Schuppe, Post Bail: America’s Justice System Runs on the Exchange of Money for 
Freedom. Some Say That’s Unfair. But Can Data Fix It?, NBC NEWS, (Aug 22, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/2A3S-HW6P] (“Philanthropic 
organizations are funding projects in more than three-dozen states to eliminate bail and adopt 
algorithm-based risk-assessment tools. Judges are pushing similar efforts in Maryland, Arizona, and 
Indiana. Lawmakers are the driving force in a handful of other states, including Illinois and 
California.”); Kim, supra note 73 (“The states that have already moved or are moving to . . . a risk-
based system are Kentucky, Colorado, Alaska, and New Jersey, all of which have recently passed or 
are implementing bail reform legislation that would dramatically reduce, if not end, the use of cash 
bail. . . . A number of efforts to curb cash bail on a system-wide level have been instituted lately, 
including statewide legislation in New Jersey and broad-sweeping court orders in Massachusetts, 
Houston, and Chicago.”). 
172.  Kim, supra note 73. 
 173.  See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. 4-216.1(c)(1) (West 2017) (requiring that all defendants 
be released “on personal recognizance or unsecured bond” unless a judge can explain the need for 
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include Philadelphia, Jackson, Atlanta, and New Orleans.174 Bail reform 
in some jurisdictions has been part of global criminal justice reform 
measures.175 State courts’ use of money-bail has attracted the attention of 
federal lawmakers who have introduced legislation that would encourage 
jurisdictions to eliminate money-bail.176 
Some jurisdictions have moved away from secured money-bail not 
by choice, but because they have been unsuccessful defendants in lawsuits 
challenging their bail administration practices. Civil rights groups and the 
United States Department of Justice have filed lawsuits challenging the 
routine use of money-bail for low-level offenses on constitutional 
grounds.177 These lawsuits claim that money-bail practices, to the extent 
pretrial detention on the record). 
 174.  Teresa Mathew, Bail Reform Takes Flight in Philly, CITYLAB (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/02/bail-reform-takes-flight-in-philly/552212/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y9SS-WWPW] (reporting that “the Philadelphia City Council unanimously voted 
to pass a resolution calling on the city’s District Attorney and Pennsylvania officials to end the 
practice of using money bail as a means of pre-trial detainment” and that “Officials in Jackson, Miss., 
agreed last month to stop using money bail in misdemeanor cases as part of a legal settlement. Several 
other cities in Mississippi have done the same. In 2016, New Orleans implemented a pilot program 
that used a risk-assessment tool to cut down on cash bail. Atlanta is considering a proposal to eliminate 
cash bonds next week. Nashville has plans to overhaul its pre-trial release program early this year.”). 
See also Hon. Jeffrey A. Kremers, Milwaukee Moves Away From Money Bail System, 90 WIS. LAW. 
6 (Jun. 2017), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/
Article.aspx?Volume=90&Issue=6&ArticleID=25667) [https://perma.cc/DV2M-EP4U]. 
 175.  Schuppe, supra note 171 (“Across the country, reformers are chipping away at money bail, 
arguing that it discriminates against the poor, ruins innocent people’s lives, fuels mass incarceration 
and contributes to wrongful convictions. The movement is part of a much broader effort to end abuses 
across the criminal justice system, from biased policing to burdensome court fees to mandatory 
minimum prison sentences.”). 
 176.  Schuppe, supra note 171. In 2017, Rep. Ted Lieu of California sponsored the “No More 
Money Bail Act of 2017,” House Bill 1437, which would prohibit the use of money-bail in the federal 
system and withhold federal funding for states that do not move to risk-based pretrial detention 
systems. The text of the proposed House Bill can be accessed at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/1437 [https://perma.cc/7AXF-RNKH]. Senator Bernie Sanders recently 
introduced companion legislation in the Senate. The text of the proposed Senate Bill can be accessed 
at https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/no-money-bail-act-2018?inline=file [https://
perma.cc/B7W3-MZV2]. 
 177.  Schuppe, supra note 171. See also Kim, supra note 73 (“Aspects of money bail are also 
under fresh judicial challenge. A . . . class action suit . . . Walker v. City of Calhoun, is challenging 
the constitutionality of bail ‘schedules’. . . . [I]n Maryland . . . the state attorney general released an 
advisory opinion in October 2016 concluding that the state’s current money bail system could be 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that imposing bail defendants can’t afford may violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘excessive bail’ and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. 
In late November, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Maryland Court 
of Appeals recommended overhauling the state’s bail system, a significant first step toward reform 
and one that has taken advocates years to achieve.”). See also Ending Money Bail, EQUAL JUSTICE 
UNDER L., https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1 [https://perma.cc/V9V4-ZK88] (listing 
cases Equal Just. Under Law has filed challenging bail practices in California, Alabama, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri). 
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they detain indigent defendants pretrial because they cannot afford 
money-bail, violate equal protection and due process guarantees. 
Litigation targets have included Calhoun, Georgia178 and Harris County, 
Texas, which operates one of the largest municipal court systems in the 
United States.179 
The Harris County lawsuit is the most notable recent victory for no-
money-bail proponents. In April 2017, a federal judge ordered Harris 
County to cease pretrial detention of people charged of low-level crimes. 
The District Court found that Harris County violated indigent pretrial 
detainees’ equal protection rights with money-bail customs and practices 
that purposefully detained misdemeanor defendants pretrial who would 
otherwise be eligible for release, but who were detained because they were 
too poor to meet secured bond release conditions.180 The Fifth Circuit 
upheld the District Court’s decision for the most part.181 The outcome is 
 178.  Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (ordering the city to “implement post-
arrest procedures that comply with the Constitution” and stipulating that “until [the city] implements 
lawful post-arrest procedures, [the city] must release any other misdemeanor arrestees in its custody, 
or who come into its custody.”). 
 179.  ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that 
state magistrates “cannot, consistent with the federal Constitution, set . . . bail on a secured basis 
requiring up-front payment from indigent misdemeanor defendants otherwise eligible for release, 
thereby converting the inability to pay into an automatic order of detention without due process and 
in violation of equal protection.”). 
 180.  Id. See also Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358–59 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (granting 
preliminary injunction based on finding that plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits that the money-bail system in Cullman County, Alabama violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment right against wealth-based detention and the right to pretrial liberty—which the court 
described as the “confluence of equal protection and due process” because “it creates one standard of 
pretrial release for wealthy defendants and another for indigent defendants.”). 
 181.  ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Rainwater, 572 F.2d 
at 1056–57) (pre-trial “imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and 
not constitutionally permissible” under both “due process and equal protection requirements”) and 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (indigents are protected by equal protection “at all stages 
of [criminal] proceedings”)). Because the Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s resolution, it 
specifically declined to reach the question of whether “the equal protection clause requires a 
categorical bar on secured money bail for indigent misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay it.” The 
Fifth Circuit further upheld the district court’s application of intermediate scrutiny under San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973); Griffen, 351 U.S. at 9 (“Both aspects of the 
Rodriguez analysis apply here: indigent misdemeanor arrestees are unable to pay secured bail, and, 
as a result, sustain an absolute deprivation of their most basic liberty interests—freedom from 
incarceration. . . . [T]his case presents the same basic injustice: poor arrestees in Harris County are 
incarcerated where similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, solely because the indigent cannot 
afford to pay a secured bond. Heightened scrutiny of the County’s policy is appropriate.”). As of the 
drafting of this Article, the Supreme Court of California was getting ready to decide similar issues in 
Humphrey (Kenneth) on H.C, 417 P.3d 769 (2018). In Humphrey, the California Supreme Court will 
decide the following under state law: (1) Does due process and equal protection require consideration 
of a criminal defendant’s ability to pay in setting money-bail; (2) May a trial court consider public 
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of the Harris County bail litigation is of particular significance because 
the core legal issues involved in that lawsuit will likely reach the Supreme 
Court eventually. 
Bail reform comes in many shapes and this is a quick-moving area 
of law. Generally speaking, however, the goal of most contemporary bail 
reform has been to lessen trial courts’ reliance on financial conditions of 
pretrial release, particularly for defendants charged with non-violent, low-
level offenses. To accomplish this, reform measures will do one or more 
of the following: first, authorize preventive detention without bail for 
defendants who pose an unacceptably high risk of flight or danger to 
others while on pretrial release; second, require or encourage trial courts 
to use pre-trial risk assessment to evaluate defendant’s likelihood to flee 
or commit crimes while on pretrial release; and, third, eliminate or curtail 
trial court discretion to impose financial bail conditions of release, 
particularly for non-violent misdemeanor offenses. 
Moving away from money-bail to non-financial conditions of release 
requires a structure and rules on which to base pretrial release decisions. 
That is where pretrial risk assessment factors in. Trial courts, pretrial 
services agencies, and bondsman, of course, engage in pretrial risk 
assessment when they make a bail decision or recommendation. But new 
to modern bail administration is the proliferation and accessibility of 
pretrial risk assessment instruments. These are developed and distributed 
by non-profits and academics and promoted as data-driven, evidence-
based, objective evaluations of defendants’ risk of flight and propensity 
to commit crimes while on pretrial release.182 They are also criticized as 
and victim safety in setting money-bail? Must it? (3) Under what circumstances does the California 
Constitution permit bail to be denied in noncapital cases? 
 182.  Schuppe, supra note 171 (“There are dozens of risk assessment tools in use today, 
developed by universities, governments, private companies and nonprofit agencies. They are used at 
various points of the criminal justice system, from pretrial to sentencing to parole. . . . The Public 
Safety Assessment, created by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, has been adopted by Kentucky, 
Arizona and more than two dozen local jurisdictions, but none to the extent of New Jersey.”); see also 
Kim, supra note 73 (“[R]isk assessment instruments . . . help judges decide whether a defendant 
should be released into the community and on what conditions. . . . In Colorado . . . which passed bail 
reform legislation in 2013, many judges now use the Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT), a 
twelve-question matrix that assesses a defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community using 
such variables as age of first arrest, prior failures to appear, and current mental health issues or alcohol 
and drug problems.”). But see Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 303, 375 (2018) (“The ideas and practices associated with evidence-based criminal justice have 
likely advanced in no small part from a hope that data, science, and technology will bring 
improvements to a system in need of reform. However, enthusiasm for the potential of new 
technologies may have led us to put the cart before the horse: widescale adoption of risk assessment 
before knowing anything about whether it will bring meaningful improvement. Risk assessment tools 
wear the clothes of an evidence-based practice—they are developed with the use of large data sets 
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biased against poor and minority defendants, as undermining judicial 
discretion, and as unreliable predictors of future dangerousness.183 
Contemporary bail reform has sparked a counter offensive by the 
multibillion184 dollar commercial bail bond industry.185 It is led primarily 
and sophistical techniques and endorsed by social scientists running policy simulations—but risk 
assessments should not be considered evidence-based until they have shown to be effective.”). 
 183.  Lapowsky, supra note 170 (“The Arnold Foundation, which designed New Jersey’s PSA 
tool, now used in several states and dozens of local jurisdictions, attempts to sidestep [the problem of 
built-in bias] by vastly limiting the number of risk factors it considers to eliminate racial or gender 
indicators. The Foundation analyzed 1.5 million pre-trial records from across the country and 
narrowed its algorithm down to look at just nine risk factors: the person’s age at the current arrest, 
whether the current offense is violent, pending charges at the time of the offense, prior misdemeanor 
convictions, prior felony convictions, whether those prior convictions were for violent crimes, prior 
failure to appear in the past two years, prior failure to appear instances that are older than two years, 
and prior incarceration sentences. Unlike other tools, it doesn’t weigh factors like education, income, 
or employment, any of which might disadvantage certain demographic groups.”). But see Rick Jones, 
The Siren Song of Objectivity: Risk Assessment Tools and Racial Disparity, 42 CHAMPION MAG. 5, 6 
(Apr. 2018) (“While advocates claim that risk assessment algorithms can reduce the impact of bias in 
the criminal justice system, opponents caution otherwise. The same bias that can impact a judge’s or 
prosecutor’s view of a client can also infiltrate the creation of an algorithm. And much like predictive 
policing, the appearance of objectivity in a scientific tool can make hidden bias even harder to combat. 
In the study performed last year, ProPublica examined the risk scores of 7,000 people arrested in 
Broward County, Florida, between 2013 and 2014. The study found the COMPAS score (the 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions tool developed by 
Northpointe) was inaccurate in predicting the likelihood of future violent crime, to the tune of an 80 
percent failure rate. More troubling, however, was how the tool failed. It was worse for black 
clients[.]”); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict 
Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/CW32-FNBC]. 
 184.  Bail bonding is currently reported to be a two-billion-dollar industry in the United States. 
See Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146. 
 185.  Thanithia Billings, Private Interest, Public Sphere: Eliminating the Use of Commercial 
Bail Bondsmen in the Criminal Justice System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1337, 1353 (2016) (“During the mid-
1990s, commercial bail bond organizations, including the National Association of Bail Insurance 
Companies and various state bail organizations, worked with the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (“ALEC”) to create an initiative titled “Strike Back!” . . . an aggressive and concerted effort 
to eliminate pretrial services agencies and release on personal recognizance bond to promote the 
interests of the commercial surety industry. Due in large part to campaigns led by bail bond industry 
lobbyists, some states have passed legislation that imposes burdensome administrative reporting 
requirements on PSAs. Critics of this legislation argue that it is designed to displace pretrial services 
programs by imposing harsh administrative burdens upon them such as stringent reporting standards. 
These same reporting standards are not required of commercial bail bondsmen despite both entities 
essentially serving the same function: securing the release of pretrial defendants. These legislative 
attacks on pretrial services organizations are part of a national strategy promulgated by ALEC.”); 
Marimow, supra note 163 (“In Maryland, Montgomery County courts use a form of risk assessment, 
although judges still set bail. Legislation to overhaul the system statewide has never made it out of 
the House Judiciary Committee in the face of opposition from the bail industry . . . .”); see also Silver-
Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146 (“State after state has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the 
practice of making that freedom contingent on money. In response, the bond industry has worked to 
undermine reforms and regulations, arguing that commercial bail is still the most efficient and 
41
Gross: Devil Take the Hindmost
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
1084 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:1043 
by two advocacy groups—the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC) and the American Bail Coalition (ABC). ALEC was established 
in 1973 to advocate for legislation favorable to the United States bail 
industry.186 ABC, formally the National Association of Bail Insurance 
Companies, was established in 1992; its stated mission is “the long term 
growth and continuation of the surety bail bond industry.”187 ABC has 
been a member of ALEC since 1993, and it has lobbied, heavily and 
successfully, for commercial bail interests in the United States.188 
Bail reform opponents have backed litigation189 and lobbying 
efforts190 to derail or undermine state efforts to move away from money-
based bail administration. In August 20180California would have become 
the first state to abolish money-bail. That reform was derailed by a 
coalition backed by the bail bond industry that gathered enough voter 
signatures to delay the law until at least November 2020, when it will be 
taxpayer-friendly way to keep the public safe and the courts running smoothly.”). Even in jurisdictions 
that continue to authorize secured money-bail bonds, the bail bond industry has been impacted by 
moves towards risk-assessment pretrial detention. See Kim, supra note 73. 
 186.  See Amanda Gullings, The Commercial Bail Industry: Profit or Public Safety?, CTR. ON 
JUV. & CRIM. JUST. (May 2012), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/
Profit_or_Public_Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PE5-QFRG].). 
 187.  Bauer, supra note 124 (“According to an old ABC newsletter, the organization was formed 
when a handful of surety executives gathered in Florida in 1992. ‘They were worried,’ the newsletter 
read. There was a ‘jihad against commercial bail . . . Government pretrial service agencies had made 
deep inroads into the corporate surety market.’ Up to that point, the use of commercial bail had been 
steadily declining. The sureties committed to reversing the trend.”); see also Kim, supra note 73 
(“Many of . . . industry-favorable laws were passed during the 1990s as the result of an extensive 
effort by the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council [ALEC] to promote the bail bond 
industry.”). 
 188.  Shane Bauer, Here’s What Sandra Bland’s Death Says About Our Broken Bail System, 
MOTHER JONES (July 27, 2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/sandra-bland-bail-
bond-system/ [https://perma.cc/TK2U-3DVY] (“Before ABC began lobbying, in 1990, commercial 
bail accounted for just 23 percent of pretrial releases, while release on recognizance accounted for 40 
percent. Today, only 23 percent of those let go before trial are released on recognizance, while 49 
percent must purchase commercial bail. Since 1990, average bail amounts have almost tripled for 
felony cases. Between 2004 and 2012, revenues of the ABC companies whose income comes almost 
entirely from bail increased 21 percent.”). See also Kim, supra note 73 (“[T]he bail industry has 
worked hard to insulate its position by pursuing and winning favorable legislation in the states.”). 
 189.  Schuppe, supra note 171 (“The bail bond industry, facing extinction, has backed two 
federal lawsuits seeking to end the algorithm’s use.”).  
 190.  Nicole Hong & Shibani Mahtani, Cash Bail – A Cornerstone of the Criminal Justice System 
Is Under Threat, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cash-bail-a-
cornerstone-of-the-criminal-justice-system-is-under-threat-1495466759 [https://perma.cc/L8TU-
GP2Q] (“Bail agents are pouring money into lobbying. Since 2011, bail-bonds companies and 
insurers have donated more than $288,000 to the campaigns of Maryland state legislators, including 
the chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. The state senate recently passed a bill 
undercutting a court rule that sought to eliminate cash bail in Maryland.”). 
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put before California voters in a referendum.191 Litigation challenges 
include arguments that detaining otherwise bailable defendants pretrial 
without bail as a preventive measure violates the federal constitution 
because, it is argued, the Eighth Amendment contains an implied right to 
bail for noncapital offenses.192 Challenges to trial courts’ use of pretrial 
risk assessment instruments, predictably, include “wrongful release” 
claims brought by victims of crimes committed by defendants while on 
pretrial release after being deemed a low risk by a pretrial risk assessment 
algorithm.193 The Arnold Foundation is the target of a products liability 
 191.  Michael McGough, The fate of California’s cash bail industry will now be decided on the 
2020 ballot, Sacramento Bee, (Jan. 17 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/
california/article224682595.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/9KXD-A9JQ] (“A law passed in 
August that would have abolished cash bail in California starting later this year will instead appear 
on the November 2020 ballot, representing a big victory and relief for the state’s more than 3,000 bail 
bondsmen faced with the prospect of their career being outlawed. . . . Senate Bill 10 would have 
abolished California’s cash bail system effective Oct. 1. . . . Needing 365,880 signatures by registered 
voters within 90 days, a coalition called Californians Against the Reckless Bail Scheme picked up 
more than 575,000 signatures in 70 days to put SB 10 on the November 2020 ballot, the American 
Bail Coalition announced in a news release.”). See also Hong et al., supra note 190 (“[The] executive 
director of the American Bail Coalition . . . said [2017] would be a ‘make-or-break year’ for cash bail. 
Earlier this year, he traveled to six state capitals—in California, Nevada, Connecticut, New York, 
Colorado and Texas—in 11 days to try to stop overhaul efforts. He said he is hopeful the Trump 
administration will slow momentum for changing bail procedures, including by cutting back on 
Justice Department grants that help jurisdictions experimenting with new bail systems.”).  
 192.  Alan Feueraug, New Jersey Is Front Line in a National Battle Over Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reform-lawsuits.html 
[https://perma.cc/9KXD-A9JQ] (“Less than a year after New Jersey established a sweeping new law 
that all but eliminated cash bail, the state has found itself facing a challenge familiar to others that 
have overhauled their bail systems: an energetic legal attack from the bail industry. In June and July 
[2017], two [federal] lawsuits were filed . . . challenging [New Jersey’s]  . . . Criminal Justice Reform 
Act . . . . While the suits have taken different legal tacks, they do have something in common: one 
was filed by a large corporate bail underwriter and the other has received support and publicity from 
professional bail agents. . . . the first suit was backed by the Lexington National Insurance 
Corporation, a bail underwriter; it alleges that a defendant with means to post cash bail with the help 
of a bondsman, but who is required to submit to non-financial conditions of release (like electronic 
monitoring and home detention) leads to a severe deprivations of liberty in violation of the federal 
constitution.”); see also Kim, supra note 73 (“Former U.S. Solicitor Paul Clement recently filed a 
lawsuit against the State of New Jersey [Holland v. Rosen], arguing that the new no-money bail 
system, which uses the Arnold Foundation tool, instead violates the federal constitution.”).  
 193.  Schuppe, supra note 171 (reporting that a number of cases have sparked legal challenges; 
one “prompted by the outcry against the release of a man accused of soliciting sex from a girl, led to 
an appellate court ruling on the handling of sex offenders and defendants’ juvenile histories. 
Authorities also complained about the release of serial criminals and people accused of fleeing police. 
But the strongest backlash came in response to the release of people charged with gun crimes. . . . The 
most dramatic example was the death of Christian Rodgers, shot in South Jersey in April, allegedly 
by a man who’d been released a few days earlier on a gun possession charge. Rodgers’ mother has 
filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the state, saying the PSA did not do enough to protect him.”); 
see also Lapowsky, supra note 170 (New Jersey’s move to no-money bail has “prompted a number 
of lawsuits, including one filed by the mother of Christian Rodgers, a 26-year-old man who was 
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and wrongful death suit in New Jersey alleging that its proprietary pretrial 
risk assessment instrument failed to detect the dangerousness of a 
defendant who committed a murder after being released pretrial on his 
own recognizance.194 In the sentencing context, trial courts’ use of 
proprietary algorithms has been challenged on due process grounds. These 
challenges include arguments that the proprietary nature of the 
instruments prevents defendants from challenging the accuracy and 
validly of the risk assessment, and that they improperly factor in gender 
and race in assessing risk.195 Somewhat less predictably are lawsuits 
challenging state courts’ authority to pass rules relating to bail as a 
violation of state separation of powers guarantees,196 or as an arbitrary use 
of court’s rule-making power.197 Lobbying and public relations efforts 
allegedly murdered by a man named Jules Black, just days after he was released from jail without bail 
earlier this year. That suit targets both [the governor] as well as the Arnold Foundation, the nonprofit 
organization that designed the PSA tool. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the case is backed by the bail-bond 
industry, including reality star Duane Chapman, better known as Dog the Bounty Hunter.”). 
 194.  See Jeff Clayton, Arnold Foundation Hires Bill Clinton’s Former Lawyer to Clarify The 
Foundation’s Complete Lack of Neutrality on Bail Reform, AM. COAL COALITION (Dec. 26, 2017), 
http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/press-releases/laura-john-arnold-foundations-neutrality-bail-
reform-facade/, [https://perma.cc/G9QH-SVCF] (reporting that “the Arnold Foundation is being sued 
[in Rodgers v. Arnold Foundation, et. al.,] for products liability and wrongful death in New Jersey 
because their risk-tool counted a prior felon in possession of a firearm with a record a mile long as 
low-risk, only to be released on his own recognizance and then brutally murder another man days 
later.”). 
 195.  State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s argument that 
trial court’s reliance on the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions at 
sentencing (COMPAS) risk assessment at sentencing violates due process because the proprietary 
nature of COMPAS prevents a defendant from challenging the accuracy and scientific validity of the 
risk assessment; and because COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating 
risk assessment). 
 196.  Lysée Mitri, supra note 145 (federal lawsuit filed in New Mexico backed by bail industry 
“targets the new Supreme Court rules that changed how judges set bond for accused criminals 
awaiting trial. Right now, people are being held in jail without the option to bond out until they see a 
judge. The suit argues that’s unconstitutional [because it violates state separation of powers in the 
state].”). 
 197.  Samantha Bryson, Bail Bond Company Sues Court Judges Over New Regulations, 
Commercial Appeal, Commercial Appeal (Mar. 16, 2015) http://archive.commercialappeal.com/
news/crime/bail-bond-company-sues-court-judges-over-new-regulations-ep-995097186-
324443561.html/ [https://perma.cc/896B-48TY] (reporting that a “Memphis bail bond company filed 
a lawsuit against the Shelby County Criminal Court and all 10 of its judges in hopes of blocking a 
new set of local regulations aimed at reining in some of the industry’s more controversial business 
practices. . . . The new rules also allow the court to drug test bail bondsman, and set further limits on 
how many bonds a company can issue at the same time.”). 
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have focused on undermining confidence in pretrial services agencies198 
and risk assessment instruments.199 
Arguments for and against bail reform have not changed much since 
the 1960s. However, political and legal changes have significantly altered 
the bail reform context. One difference is courts’ increasingly heavy 
reliance on financial conditions of release in bail administration, even as 
many jurisdictions move away from money-bail as a routine condition of 
release. In 1990, nationally, trial courts imposed money-bail as a 
condition of release for 24 percent of pretrial detainees. In 2009, they 
imposed money-bail as a condition of release for almost 50 percent of 
pretrial detainees.200 The increased use of money-bail naturally increases 
the size, strength, and influence of the bail bond industry. And that 
industry is operating in a vastly different campaign and lobbying climate 
than the 1960s.201 Another change is the proliferation of technology and 
 198.  See Gullings, supra note 188 (“Since the 1990s commercial bail associations have unified 
to advocate bail policies at state and federal levels which will work to ensure market stability for the 
bail industry. . . . Both ALEC and the for-profit bail bonding industry have attempted to push 
nationally a model bill titled the ‘Citizens Right to Know: Pretrial Release Act,’ which would place 
numerous (and in most cases, additional) reporting requirements on pretrial release service agencies. 
In support of this and other bills, in April 2010, AIA and ALEC sent copies of the publication, 
Taxpayer Funded Pretrial Release – A Failed System, to 2,500 legislatures across the country. In 
addition to writing, distributing, and lobbying for criminal justice policies to expand their profits, the 
commercial bail industry has consistently worked in direct opposition against publicly funded pretrial 
service agencies. Bail bondsmen across the country have prioritized limiting the amount of funding 
that is allocated to pretrial service agencies. . . . From a business perspective, publicly funded pretrial 
release programs are the only competition the bail industry faces; therefore, they are the only 
substantial threat to their ability to profit from an offender’s pretrial release. In response to this 
competition, the bail industry has worked ardently to undermine the accountability and funding of 
pretrial release programs.”) (citing SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 4, at 25).  
 199.  A statement on the American Bail Coalition website about Nevada’s adoption of a pretrial 
risk assessment tool is illustrative of the narrative: “We are not sure how to measure this, but it makes 
clear what we have been saying all along—this is all about class-war talking-point justice and some 
mythical bipolar false construct that we can properly identify the right and wrong people using a 
static, check-box algorithm.” Jeff Clayton, Results In: Nevada Bail Reform Project a Failure, 
AMERICAN BAIL COALITION, http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/press-releases/results-nevada-
bail-reform-project-failure/ [https://perma.cc/P3U4-DYUX]. 
 200.  See Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146 (“The use of financial conditions for bail 
has not always been as widespread as it is today. In 1990, only 24 percent of those released from jail 
before trial were required to pay. That number soared to almost 50 percent in 2009, the most recent 
year for which national figures are available. In some jurisdictions, the number is far higher: In New 
Orleans in 2015, 63 percent of misdemeanor defendants and 87 percent of felony defendants had to 
pay to be released before trial, according to a study by the Vera Institute of Justice, a nonprofit that 
seeks to improve the criminal justice system.”). 
 201.  See Gullings, supra note 186 (“Many individual bail bond companies have hired their own 
lobbyists to advocate for local legislation, such as county ordinances which will limit pretrial service 
programs. These individual business owners have also united to form statewide associations . . . and 
even nationwide associations, like the American Bail Coalition, to advocate for state legislation. 
These statewide associations have also recruited assistance from the powerful conservative think tank, 
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the development of pretrial risk assessment algorithms, which hold out 
the possibility of a low-cost and efficient means to screen defendants for 
pretrial release eligibility, a function often outsourced to bail bondsman 
in traditional bail administration. Finally, non-profit and community bail 
funds, and crowdsourcing are becoming increasingly more available and 
accessible means for indigent defendants to post bail without having to 
pay the bondsman’s fee.202 
The debate between money-bail reformers and money-bail 
supporters can be condensed around three main themes. One, fairness. 
Money-bail enriches the surety industry at the expense of poor people. Or, 
alternatively, it is an equalizer because it permits all bailable defendants 
access to pretrial liberty. Two, economics. Eliminating money-bail 
reduces jail populations203 without an increase in the failure to appear 
rate.204 Or, alternatively, it preserves public resources by relieving 
ALEC, to advance their political agenda and opposition to pretrial release programs at both the state 
and national levels. Unfortunately, despite the success rates of many pretrial release programs across 
the country, the bail bondsmen are able to purchase a more powerful lobby to persuade state 
legislatures to support their political agenda. Bondsmen are able to gain this political support through 
large campaign contributions, sponsoring legislation (such as ballot measures) which establishes 
political allies, and donating to political parties. Pretrial service programs on the other hand, because 
they are publicly funded, do not have the organizational capacity or the fiscal resources to lobby for 
their programs in the same fashion that the bail industry has been able to.”). See also Katherine 
Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238, 241 (2016) (“Similarly, institutions that have flourished 
as a result of mass incarceration often work to ensure its continued existence. For example, private 
corporations that own and operate prisons (or profit from them), prison officers’ unions, the bail 
industry, and even county clerks often seek to block progressive criminal justice.”) (citations omitted). 
 202.  Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 587–88 (2017) (“In recent 
years, community groups in jurisdictions across the United States have increasingly begun to use bail 
funds to post bail on behalf of strangers, using a revolving pool of money.”). Community bail funds 
and non-profit bail bonding is not a new concept – individual citizens and non-profit groups pooled 
and donated money to fund bail for civil rights activists protesting racial segregation in the south who 
were rounded up in mass arrests and charged with inflated or frivolous charges. See Goldfarb, supra 
note 4, at 59–91. But changes in technology, particularly the reach of social media, make publicizing 
efforts to raise money easier. See id.; see also Caroline Grueskin, The Uncertain World of 
Crowdfunding Your Day in Court, WIRED (NOV. 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/11/the-uncertain-world-of-crowdfunding-lawyer-fees-and-bail/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8C7-ZR97].  
 203.  According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 95 percent of the jail population growth 
since 2000 was attributable to an increase in defendants being held pretrial. Terersa Wiltz, Locked 
Up: Is Cash Bail on the Way Out, Stateline, (Jan. 03, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/03/01/locked-up-is-cash-bail-on-the-way-out 
[https://perma.cc/RHW6-NVH4]. 
 204.  Lapowsky, supra note 170 (“Just months in[to bail reform] . . . New Jersey saw a 19 
percent reduction in its jail population overall between January 1 and May 31 of this year, with just 
eight people being held on bail throughout the entire state over that time period. Others are either 
being released with certain conditions or detained without bail.”).  
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jurisdictions of the need to administer expensive pretrial services 
agencies. And, three, public safety. Money-bail undermines public safety 
because it allows defendants with resources to purchase their freedom, 
regardless of the nature of the allegations against them. Or, alternatively, 
it enhances public safety because high bail amounts can keep dangerous 
defendants out of circulation while awaiting trial. A corollary issue 
concerns the efficacy and reliability of pretrial risk assessment 
instruments. Either they are efficient, low-cost evidence-based 
instruments that promote uniform, objective pretrial release and detention 
decisions. Or, alternatively, they are a flawed substitute for judicial 
judgment and experience whose reliability is skewed by built-in biases. 
Thus, depending on the argument, moving away from money-bail to risk 
assessment either produces a fairer and more cost-effective system, or 
creates an unnecessary taxpayer burden that infringes on judicial 
discretion and produces unreliable results. 
V. OBSERVATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR RIGHT TO BAIL JURISDICTIONS 
Then or now, one is hard pressed to find support at the national level 
for money-based bail administration among policymakers, the legal 
profession, and the media—there is an extraordinary level of consensus in 
those sectors about the need to reform money-bail practices that routinely 
jail large numbers of poor people charged with non-violent, low-level 
offenses.205 For good reason. Detention is expensive and empirical 
research shows that pretrial detention of defendants charged with non-
violent misdemeanors is generally unnecessary to protect the public or 
ensure their presence at future hearings; it also shows that individualized 
pretrial release determinations achieve those goals more effectively.206 
Money-bail works tremendous hardships on poor defendants and their 
 205.  Herring, supra note 73 (“Most of the legal establishment, including the American Bar 
Association and the National District Attorneys Association, hates the bail bond business, saying it 
discriminates against poor and middle-class defendants, does nothing for public safety, and usurps 
decisions that ought to be made by the justice system.”). Gullings, supra note 186, at 4 (“The 
commercial bail industry has been negatively critiqued for nearly one hundred years and the criticisms 
have largely remained the same: commercial bail does not ensure public safety and discriminates 
against those who cannot afford it. In spite of this, commercial bail remains the primary avenue for 
pretrial release [in the United States], due in part to the political power it wields through extensive 
lobbying activities.”). 
 206.  Bauer, supra note 124 (“Criminal-justice policy happens to be a field with one of the 
greatest disconnects between what we know and what we do,” said Michael Jacobson, former director 
of the Vera Institute. “It’s a research-driven field like medicine, but we also have toxic politics to deal 
with. . . . If you were just basing policy off research, there would be no consideration of money bail.”). 
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families and communities.207 Racial minorities experience these hardships 
most acutely.208 Pretrial detention significantly impacts the outcome of a 
defendant’s case because it hampers his ability to assist in his defense and 
it can pressure a plea deal.209 Money-bail differently impacts defendants 
with limited financial resources,210 while allowing defendants with means 
 207.  Schuppe, supra note 171 (“allowing people to pay for their release has proved unfair to 
people who don’t have much money. The poor are far more likely to get stuck in jail, which makes 
them far more likely to get fired from jobs, lose custody of children, plead guilty to something they 
didn’t do, serve time in prison and suffer the lifelong consequences of a criminal conviction. Those 
who borrow from a bail bondsman often fall into crippling debt.”); Bauer, supra note 124 (“Even a 
few weeks in jail can wreak havoc on the lives of the accused. Seventy-one percent of jail inmates 
had jobs when they were arrested, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Losing those jobs 
because they can’t post bail leaves their families at risk. Studies also show that people become more 
likely to reoffend the longer they are detained pretrial. With just two to three days of detention, low-
risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent 
defendants held less than 24 hours. Low-risk defendants held 8 to 14 days are 51 percent more likely 
to recidivate within two years than equivalent defendants held one day or less.”). 
 208.  Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, supra note 146 (“Commercial bail fees, often scraped together 
by multiple family members, siphon millions from poor, predominantly African-American and 
Hispanic communities. Over a five-year span, Maryland families paid more than $256 million in 
nonrefundable bail premiums, according to a report by the state’s Office of the Public Defender. More 
than $75 million of that was paid in cases resolved with no finding of guilt, and the vast majority of 
it was paid by black families.”). See also Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, HARV. 
L. SCH. 7 (2016) (“Money bail also results in ‘increased rates of pretrial detention for Black and 
Latino defendants’ because of the “well-established linkages between wealth and race.’”).  
 209.  Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 
STAN. L. REV. 711 (2017) (study, based on “detailed data on hundreds of thousands of misdemeanor 
cases resolved in . . . the third-largest county in the United States” establishes “that detained 
defendants are 25% more likely than similarly situated releasees to plead guilty, are 43% more likely 
to be sentenced to jail, and receive jail sentences that are more than twice as long on average,” 
differences that “persist even after fully controlling for the initial bail amount, offense, demographic 
information, and criminal history characteristics”); Appleman, supra note 66 at 1320 (“Pretrial 
detention also augments the possibility of conviction. Incarcerated defendants before trial are more 
likely to be found or plead guilty and serve prison time than those released pretrial. The mere 
possibility of pretrial imprisonment often compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their right 
to trial. The prospect of being incarcerated, even for a short time, can look ruinous to poor defendants, 
as this often means the loss of their livelihood, severe disruptions to their family lives, or both. 
Accordingly, when confronted with an unaffordable bail, a large number of pretrial detainees simply 
plead guilty.”); Kim, supra note 73 (“The inability to afford bail can have serious collateral 
consequences for defendants. For example, research by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation found 
that people detained pretrial were more than four times more likely to be sentenced to jail than people 
who were released, more likely to be given longer sentences, and more likely to be recidivists. People 
in jail are less able to meet with their lawyers, point them toward important witnesses, and put together 
the best defense. The disruptions resulting from staying in jail might mean the loss of a job or housing, 
which leads to economic instability or other consequences that could prompt a rearrest. People in 
pretrial detention are also more likely to plead guilty before the trial, because that might be the only 
way to avoid spending months or years in jail awaiting their time in court.”).  
 210.  Bauer, supra note 124 (“Of the nearly 750,000 people in America’s jails at any given time, 
two-thirds are awaiting trial. Of accused felons held until case disposition, 89 percent are there 
because they can’t afford bail.”). 
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to purchase their pretrial liberty, regardless of the seriousness of the 
offense with which they are charged, or their risk of flight.211 In sum, the 
United States locks up a lot of poor, low-level defendants pretrial,212 
which is expensive, 213 counterproductive, and generally unnecessary.214 
Many aspects of the American criminal justice system make it a crime to 
be poor.215 Money-based bail, in a very real sense, punishes the poor who 
have not even been adjudicated guilty of any crime. 
 211.  This is precisely what Tiffany Li, a member of a wealthy California family charged with 
felony murder did in 2017. California charged Ms. Li with felony murder in the shooting death of the 
father of her children, and the court set her bail at $35 million. California law allows money-bail to 
be secured by property in lieu of cash, but doubles the bail amount when it is secured by property. 
Ms. Li posted $4,240,000 in cash, and the balance of more than $60 million in property. This was 
reportedly the highest bail amount ever set in that county. Prosecutors originally asked that Ms. Li be 
held pretrial without bail, a request the court denied. Christine Pelisek, California Heiress Posts 
‘Unprecedented’ $35M Bail After Allegedly Plotting to Kill Her Ex, PEOPLE MAG. (Apr. 06, 2017, 
3:36 PM), http://people.com/crime/california-murder-suspect-tiffany-li-posts-35-million-bail/ 
[https://perma.cc/GL2W-PYXN].  
 212.  See Kim, supra note 73 (“[T]he majority of people currently in the nation’s jails are 
defendants legally presumed innocent and awaiting trial. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 467,500 of the nation’s 744,592 jail inmates in mid-2014—or 63 percent—were 
‘unconvicted’ defendants in pretrial status, up from roughly 56 percent of the nation’s 621,149 jail 
inmates in 2000. . . . According to a 2015 survey by the National Association of Counties, 69 percent 
of county jail administrators judged the majority of their inmates to be ‘low-risk’ defendants.”). 
 213.  Schuppe, Post Bail, supra note 171 (“The number of people behind bars in the United 
States has jumped more than threefold, to 2.1 million, since 1980, according to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. Of the 693,300 prisoners held in local jails in December 2015, 62 percent were waiting for 
trial, at an estimated cost of $14 billion a year. The Prison Policy Initiative projects that 70 percent of 
those pretrial detainees are charged with non-violent crimes — mostly involving drugs or property 
offenses.”). See also Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial 
Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. at 787 (estimating that the release on personal bond of the lowest-risk 
detainees would have resulted in 1,600 fewer felonies and 2,400 fewer misdemeanors within the 
following eighteen months).   
 214.  See Kim, supra note 73 (“One factor driving th[e] current wave of bail reform is new 
research finding that alternatives to up-front money bail work better to ensure that defendants show 
up in court. A 2013 study by the Pretrial Justice Institute . . . found that ‘unsecured’ bonds, which 
require no money up-front . . . are just as effective as traditional cash bail in ensuring court 
appearances and preventing rearrests. In a controlled experiment in Colorado, defendants released on 
an unsecured bond, regardless of their risk, were less likely to commit new crimes than defendants 
released on traditional money bail. And all but the highest-risk defendants were more likely to show 
up in court. A 2011 study funded by the Justice Department also found that simply mailing defendants 
a reminder to show up in court significantly reduced the number of people who failed to appear. In 
an experiment involving more than 7,800 misdemeanor defendants in Nebraska, only 8.3 percent 
failed to show up after getting a mailed reminder about their court date, along with information about 
what would happen if they failed to show. By comparison, 12.6 percent of defendants who got no 
such reminder were no-shows.”). 
 215.  See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying The Price, NAT’L PUBLIC 
RADIO (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-
punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/TF9M-HBDU] (“in at least 43 states and the District of Columbia, 
defendants can be billed for a public defender; in at least 41 states, inmates can be charged room and 
board for jail and prison stays; in at least 44 states, offenders can get billed for their own probation 
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Notwithstanding quantifiable and undisputed benefits of moving 
away from money-based bail, a number of states continue to rely heavily 
on financial conditions of release in bail administration and on the 
involvement of bail bondsmen in pretrial release and supervision. If the 
case for bail reform is so obvious to national legal observers, why all states 
have not embraced risk-based pretrial release and detention bail practices 
needs to be asked. Bail reform has received a tremendous amount of 
national attention in the popular press and legal circles over the last 
several years. Most of this attention focuses on the negative aspects of 
money-based bail practices and the excesses of the commercial bail bond 
industry generally. But bail administration in the United States is a matter 
of uniquely local concern with a deep constitutional roots, accompanied 
by many legal complexities. As such, it is not something for which there 
is a uniform or easy fix. Addressing the ills of money-based bail 
administration, therefore, requires consideration of legal and practical 
hurdles to reform on the state and local level in jurisdictions where 
secured money-bail is entrenched. The bail bond industry, to be sure, is a 
major player in promoting secured money-bail in the United States And 
the industry has put up a good fight in jurisdictions that have recently 
pursued bail reform through lawsuits and legislative campaigns. But its 
efforts have also been rebuffed, most recently in New Jersey. It is, 
therefore, overly-simplistic to assign sole or even primary responsibility 
for stalled and patchy bail reform in the United States to the bail bond 
industry. A more comprehensive analysis requires jurisdiction-specific 
consideration of states’ constitutional and statutory bail administration 
laws and practices, and of practical reasons why trial courts continue to 
rely heavily on secured money-bail in some jurisdictions. 
The reason secured money-bail cannot be completely eliminated in 
right to bail jurisdictions is fairly straightforward from a legal 
perspective—setting high bail amounts is the only way to protect the 
public from dangerous bailable defendants in those states. Modern bail 
reform is about what conditions of release will occupy a dominant role in 
pretrial release practices. At its core, it is a choice between money-based 
bail practices, on one hand, and risk-based practices, on the other. But 
and parole supervision; and in all states except Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, there’s a fee for 
the electronic monitoring devices defendants and offenders are ordered to wear.”). See also In a 
Mississippi Jail, Convictions and Counsel Appear Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/in-a-mississippi-jail-convictions-and-counsel-appear-
optional.html [https://perma.cc/97UL-LLEY] (In Mississippi there is no state law setting a time limit 
on detention before an indictment resulting in “poor people . . . sitting in jail for weeks and even 
months before they ever see a lawyer.”).  
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these are not mutually-exclusive propositions. Secured money-bail can be 
a part of risk-based bail administration—in fact, as noted, all jurisdictions 
in the United States, including those that authorize preventive pretrial 
detention without bail for noncapital defendants, authorize secured 
money-bail as a condition of release. And traditional bail incorporates 
risk-based practices—risk assessment is routinely used in traditional bail 
administration to inform the amount of bail or other conditions of release, 
and to determine whether a capital defendant should have bail set. The 
difference is that risk-based bail administration can function without 
money-bail, but traditional bail administration cannot. Risk-based bail 
administration can incorporate money-bail (as all United States 
jurisdiction do), but traditional bail cannot fully incorporate risk-based 
pretrial detention principles. This is because the traditional right to bail 
never authorizes detention of noncapital defendants without bond, 
regardless of risk, it only allows courts to calibrate conditions of release 
to risk. Traditional bail needs money-bail to preserve the option of setting 
unpayable bail to protect public safety. While perhaps justly criticized as 
a manipulation of money-bail, unpayable bail is an inevitability in a right 
to bail jurisdiction.216 
Abrogating an absolute constitutional right to bail, of course, 
requires a constitutional amendment. This is a potentially cumbersome, 
lengthy, expensive and divisive process that requires voters to tackle 
questions about the purpose and limits of pretrial detention, and whether 
to vest trial courts with power to detain accused persons pretrial as a public 
safety measure. Pure risk-based bail administration rejects the core 
normative value of the traditional right to bail—that a person who is 
merely accused of a crime should remain at liberty pretrial if he can 
provide the court sufficient guarantees that he will return for future 
proceedings. This is a right “as old as the law of England itself.”217 
 216.  A trial court’s discretion to set unpayable bail, of course, is not limitless and is subject to 
some outer limits under due process guarantees. See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 962–63 (bail in amount 
likely to result in long-term pretrial detention is functional equivalent of order for pretrial detention, 
and must be evaluated in light of due process requirements applicable to deprivation of liberty, 
including procedure to test accuracy of trial court’s assessment of defendant’s perceived 
dangerousness.); see also United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1991) (trial court 
could impose financial condition defendant could not afford, resulting in detention, provided court 
“complied with the procedural requirements for a valid detention order, including written findings of 
fact and a written statement of reasons for determining that the financial condition imposed was an 
indispensable condition for release.”). 
 217.  See Stephen, supra note 6, at 233 (“The right to be bailed in certain cases is as old as the 
law of England itself, and is explicitly recognized by our earliest writers. When the administration of 
justice was in its infancy, arrest meant imprisonment without preliminary inquiry till the sheriff held 
his tourn at least, and, in more serious cases, till the arrival of the justices, which might be delayed 
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Ultimately, the ease with which a particular jurisdiction’s foundational 
laws can be amended and its voters’ readiness to engage with these issues 
is one of the most important factors in a state’s bail reform prospects. 
Successful bail reform requires trade-offs and institutional 
bandwidth, barriers to change rarely acknowledged in the popular media. 
Individual jurisdictions may have practical reasons they have not pursued 
bail reform, and lack of resources is probably chief among them. Risk-
based bail administration requires a mechanism by which large numbers 
of defendants can be screened effectively and quickly if courts are to 
promptly release defendants the state has no interest in detaining pretrial. 
It also requires some capacity to supervise defendants who are released 
pretrial subject to non-financial conditions. If secured money-bail is 
available, some pretrial screening and supervision can be outsourced to 
the bondsman.218 Thus, to move away from money-based bail 
administration, courts must have a reliable and affordable substitute for 
the pretrial screening and supervision functions provided by the bail bond 
industry. In jurisdictions that have successfully implemented risk-based 
bail reform, like the federal system and Washington D.C., that role is filled 
by professional pretrial services agencies under the supervision of the 
courts. And that, of course, costs money.219 
Making risk assessment and non-financial release conditions the 
backbone of bail administration presupposes courts can make risk-based 
determinations on a short turnaround. Indeed, the debate over money-bail 
often overlooks the fact that trial courts must make detention decisions 
shortly after the defendant’s arrest, often processing large numbers of 
defendants based on scanty information and without input from defense 
counsel. In jurisdictions that cannot fund robust state-wide pretrial 
services agencies and that do not provide appointed counsel for 
for years, and it was therefore a matter of the utmost importance to be able to obtain a provision 
release from custody.”). A “tourn” was a court presided over by a sheriff. Tourn, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tourn [https://perma.cc/QE87-TGVQ]. See 
also Simpson, 387 P.3d at 1274 (“Freedom from pretrial detention absent extraordinary circumstances 
traces to the common law, where the general rule was against pretrial incarceration and in favor of 
bail, except for capital crimes—an exception grounded in the belief that defendants in such cases 
would flee to save their lives.”). 
 218.  In jurisdictions that have outlawed or significantly sidelined commercial bail bonding, 
defendants work directly with pretrial services agencies, not bail bondsmen, in undergoing pretrial 
release assessment. Johnson & Stevens, supra note 131, at 196. 
 219.  Marimow, supra note 163 (“When District [of Columbia] judges talk about the system, 
they almost always encounter skepticism about how other jurisdictions could replicate it. Federal 
prosecutors handle most local criminal cases in the District. The federal government entirely funds 
the independent pre-trial agency whose $62 million budget pays for about 350 employees and includes 
a drug-testing lab, treatment services and mental-health and drug courts.”). 
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defendants at detention hearings,220 this puts trial courts to the choice of 
unnecessarily detaining a defendant pretrial or gambling with public 
safety.221 
Pretrial risk assessment instruments, and their developers and 
proponents, are the unknown quantity in today’s bail reform. These 
instruments are typically provided at no cost to jurisdictions willing to 
accept the developer’s terms of use. At first blush, free computer-based 
pretrial risk assessment instruments may seem an ideal solution for 
jurisdictions that cannot afford a full-scale professional pretrial services 
agency like that in D.C. These instruments, however, are relatively new 
and untested and their use may have as yet-unknown unintended 
consequences.222 A jurisdiction that adopts a pretrial risk assessment 
instrument without adequately vetting it and properly training those 
tasked with its administration risks incorporating a faulty or unreliable 
element into its bail administration that could compromise public safety 
or discriminate against certain defendants. And, in light of recent 
wrongful release lawsuits, choosing a specific risk assessment instrument 
is now a decision that carries with it potential exposure to litigation. 
Money-based bail administration undeniably offers a certain level of 
ease and predictability in application. Jurisdictions that routinely rely on 
secured money-bail usually have bail bond schedules. Bail bond schedules 
are published and they are simple to use—they list offenses along with an 
amount of bail deemed presumptively reasonable for each offense. Bail 
bond schedules, theoretically, can help reduce the risk of idiosyncratic bail 
determinations among judges in the same jurisdictions, making them less 
vulnerable to constitutional excessiveness challenges, or due process and 
equal protection challenges. To the extent bail bond schedules produce 
 220.  Another point of departure among jurisdictions is whether defendants are afforded a right 
to counsel at public expense for the bail hearing. Federal procedure provides indigents the right to 
counsel at public expense at the bail hearing, but most states do not. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) 
(defendant “who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent the 
defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal.” John P. Gross, 
The Right to Counsel but Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of State Criminal Procedures for 
Pre-Trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831 (2017) (“There is a widely-held belief that the state provides 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants at their initial appearance in state court. However, the majority 
of states do not provide counsel to indigent defendants at their initial appearance when a judicial 
officer determines conditions of pretrial release.”). 
 221.  See Wiltz, supra note 203 (“Typically, judges only get a few minutes to assess a 
defendant’s case, . . . [s]o often . . . judges set bail without knowing the full circumstances, which 
hamstrings them.’ The fear is I’m going to let somebody go and they’re going to go out and do 
something terrible, or they won’t come back, so I’ll set bail,’ [one judge] said.”). 
 222.  See Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1125 (2018). 
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uniform treatment of similarly-situated defendants, money-bail 
administration can claim the virtue of promoting an appearance of fairness 
and consistency across a jurisdiction. But only to a point—the automatic 
application of bail bond schedules to the disadvantage of indigent 
defendants can also open a jurisdiction’s bail administration to equal 
protection and due process challenges.223 
Jurisdictions that use bail bond schedules often authorize peace 
officers to accept bail directly from an arrestee without having to appear 
before a judicial officer.224 By obviating the necessity of a hearing, this 
“catch and release” practice can avoid unnecessary short-term detention 
of low level arrestees. The advantage of allowing peace officers to 
immediately release some arrestees if they can post bail pursuant to a bail 
schedule may not be obvious in large urban jurisdictions with ready access 
to judicial officers. But in rural, low-population states where judicial 
officers have jurisdiction over vast geographic areas and detention 
facilities are few and far between, allowing peace officers to accept bail 
from defendants without a hearing and without booking them into jail may 
be indispensable. This practice would not be possible if a risk-assessment 
needed to be performed first. Thus, in some instances, money-based bail 
can actually facilitate the routine pretrial release of persons charged with 
low-level offenses (assuming they can post bail) and relieve time 
pressures on the judicial system that are triggered by a custodial arrest.225 
A point frequently made in the popular media money-bail is that it 
results in the detention of defendants who are presumed innocent. The 
 223.  See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (individualized bail determination that takes defendant’s 
financial resources into account required by due process and equal protection; courts have found use 
of master bail bond schedules to set same bail amount for everyone for a particular offense 
unconstitutional, without regard to individual financial circumstances or alternative conditions of 
release) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978)) (“incarceration of those who 
cannot” meet master bond schedule, “without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, 
infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements”); Walker v. Calhoun, No. 4:15–
CV–0170–HLM, 2016 WL 361612 *10 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), (“Any bail or bond scheme that 
mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different offenses to obtain pretrial release, without any 
consideration of indigence or other factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause”) (citing cases), 
vacated on other grounds by Walker v. Calhoun, 682 Fed. Appx. 721 (2017). 
 224.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-302(1) & (2) (West 2019) (except in cases involving 
enumerated domestic violence offenses, judges may establish bail schedules for offenses over which 
the judge has original jurisdiction and defendant may be released on bail by posting bail with a peace 
officer without first appearing before a judge).  
 225.  A defendant arrested without a warrant must be presented to a judicial officer for a probable 
cause determination “promptly” after arrest, which the Court has interpreted to mean without 
unreasonable delay. The Court has not set a fixed time for the probable cause hearing, but has held 
that a hearing more than 48 hours after arrest is presumptively unreasonable. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103 (1975); Cty. of  Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991) (McLaughlin explicitly 
included bail hearings in the determinations that must be made within 48 hours).  
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argument is that it is unfair to detain an accused pretrial for want of money 
because he has not been found guilty of any crime. This argument ignores 
the fact that the potentially dangerous defendant who is detained pretrial 
without bail in a preventive detention jurisdiction can make precisely the 
same claim because he too is presumed innocent. The presumption of 
innocence, well-known, but little understood by the general public, is 
perhaps the least compelling argument in favor of bail reform. Contrary 
to popular understanding, the presumption of innocence can claim no 
constitutional pedigree.226 It is an evidentiary rule that requires the fact 
finder to start from a clean slate at trial, not a legal mandate requiring 
lawyers and judges to ignore evidence of guilt at the pretrial stage. There 
is a difference between legal truth and factual truth, and it is at play when 
a defendant who actually did something is acquitted or charges against 
him are dismissed—although he committed an act in fact, if the state does 
not meet its evidentiary burden at trial, or if there is a legal defect in the 
investigation and prosecution requiring dismissal (such as a botched 
search), the defendant has not committed a crime as a matter of law. In 
making pretrial detention decisions, courts routinely consider the 
likelihood that the defendant committed the crime with which is he 
charged based on the evidence available at that juncture. This principle is 
reflected in state constitutional bail provisions that allow trial courts to 
detain capital defendants without bail if the proof against the defendant is 
“evident” or the presumption of his guilt is “great.” These provisions 
would make no sense if the law recognized a presumption of innocence at 
the pretrial detention stage. 
States unwilling or unable to undertake constitutional bail reform and 
eliminate the absolute right to bail for noncapital offenses in favor of 
preventive pretrial detention have options. One option, of course, is to do 
nothing. The Harris County litigation, however, is a cautionary tale for 
jurisdictions with money-based bail systems that attract the attention of 
bail reformers.227 Economic inequities produced by money-based bail 
 226.  See Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim, 63 
JURIST: STUD. CHURCH L. & MINISTRY 106 (2003). 
 227.  Jolie McCullough, How Harris County’s Federal Bail Lawsuit Spreads Beyond Houston: 
Texas Counties Are Watching to See How Harris County’s Fight Against Court-Ordered Bail 
Practices Will Affect Them, TEXAS TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/02/how-harris-countys-bail-lawsuit-spreads-beyond-houston/ 
[https://perma.cc/9L6E-UGTT]. As a result of the Harris County litigation, the state of Texas found 
itself scrambling to restructure it bail system. Jolie McCullough, Gov. Greg Abbott’s Influence Has 
Shifted Texas Bail Reform Efforts Toward a Bill That Would Give Him More Control, TEXAS TRIB. 
(Mar. 18, 2019, 12:22 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/03/18/bail-reform-texas-legislature-
damon-allen-act-bills/ [https://perma.cc/P2DR-945D]. 
55
Gross: Devil Take the Hindmost
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
1098 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:1043 
administration have also attracted the attention of the United States 
Department of Justice228 and members of Congress.229 Like Harris 
County, jurisdictions that choose to wait and see, or that simply lack the 
political wherewithal to change course, may find themselves the target of 
litigation and the subject of federal court injunctions. Should Congress 
pass federal legislation that jeopardizes federal funds for states that do not 
move away from money-bail, or should the Supreme Court take up state 
bail administration as a federal constitutional matter, jurisdictions that 
wait too long to tackle bail reform may find themselves playing catch-up 
to federal mandates and lose valuable time in which to experiment with 
local solutions. 
This is not to say that all right to bail jurisdictions that do not abandon 
money-based bail practices are at similar risk of litigation or federal 
scrutiny. Reliance on money-bail as a condition of release, standing alone, 
does not raise federal constitutional concerns. Rather, it is the routine use 
of money-bail resulting in the widespread pretrial detention of indigents 
in the absence of a state interest for detaining them that may cross the 
federal equal protection line.230 In light of recent federal court holdings, 
 228.  In 2016, the Department of Justice, under President Obama, also issued a “Dear Colleague” 
letter to state and local courts around the country, advising them that courts “must not employ bail or 
bond practices that cause indigent defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford 
to pay for their release.” Lapowsky, supra note 170. 
 229.  In 2016, California Representative Ted Lieu introduced a bill that would withhold federal 
funding from states that do not reform their money-bail systems. See No Money Bail Act of 2016, 
H.R. 4611, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).  
 230.  The Fifth Circuit concisely identified the issue in upholding the district court in the Harris 
County litigation as follows:  
In sum, the essence of the district court’s equal protection analysis can be boiled down to 
the following: take two misdemeanor arrestees who are identical in every way—same 
charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc. – except that one is wealthy 
and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom and practice, with their lack of 
individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail schedule, both 
arrestees would almost certainly receive identical secured bail amounts. One arrestee is 
able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to 
plead guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to 
bear the social costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt 
of all of these, simply because he has less money than his wealthy counterpart. The district 
court held that this state of affairs violates the equal protection clause, and we agree. 
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163. See also Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1201 (5th Cir. 1977) (Florida 
bail system, which failed to provide for: (1) a presumption in favor of release on recognizance and 
(2) priority for nonfinancial alternatives, violated equal protection of indigents because it gave court 
“essentially unreviewable discretion to impose money bail . . . [E]qual protection standards are not 
satisfied unless the judge is required to consider less financially onerous forms of release before he 
imposes money bail. Requiring a presumption in favor of non-money bail accommodates the State’s 
interest in assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial as well as the defendant’s right to be free 
pending trial, regardless of his financial status.”). See also ABA urges U.S. Supreme Court to review 
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states whose bail practices do not require courts to impose non-financial 
conditions of release for low-risk defendants whenever possible, if 
challenged in federal court, may end up on the wrong side of 
contemporary federal equal protection jurisprudence. They also risk 
exposure to civil wrongful detention claims.231 
It is possible to address some of the main criticisms of money-based 
bail administration short of abrogating the constitutional right to bail. 
Right to bail states can, for example, amend their statutory laws to 
encourage or require trial courts to forgo secured money-bail for low-risk 
defendants. This can be accomplished by requiring automatic release on 
personal recognizance of defendants with no significant criminal history 
who are charged with non-violent misdemeanors that carry minor 
penalties. Courts can also be encouraged or required to use risk 
assessment tools to support their bail decisions. This hybrid approach 
incorporates some of the principles of preventive detention by 
differentiating between non-violent, misdemeanor offenses, on one hand, 
and violent or felony offenses, on the other. And this practice should lead 
to routine pretrial release on non-financial conditions of defendants who 
are a low risk of flight or danger to the community. However, unless trial 
courts are required to treat money-bail as a last resort, introducing risk 
assessment as just another bail consideration may end up effecting a 
change on paper that is not carried out in practice.232 
constitutionality of structured bail systems, (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/01/aba-urges-u-s—supreme-
court-to-review-constitutionality-of-stru/ [https://perma.cc/7J3R-KS8G] (reporting that “[t]he 
American Bar Association filed an amicus brief Monday with the U.S. Supreme Court, contending 
that the Calhoun, Ga., bail system, which ties pretrial release directly to a fixed-payment schedule of 
offenses, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the 14th Amendment” and noting 
that “ scores of jurisdictions nationwide use similar inflexible money-bail systems in their criminal 
justice proceedings although many states and local entities have discarded their use in recent years.”). 
 231.  Wiltz, supra note 203 (“High-profile cases have highlighted the cracks in the system. 
Sandra Bland, an Illinois woman with a history of depression, apparently hanged herself in a Texas 
jail after being unable to post bail for a routine traffic stop in 2015. Her family won a $1.9 million 
wrongful death suit in September.”). 
232.  Ian MacDougall, The Failure of New York’s Bail Law, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Nov. 24, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/the-failure-of-new-yorks-bail-law/
546212/ [https://perma.cc/8KK2-GPJK] (“New York City’s history . . . underscores the limits of 
systemic reforms. Legal change on paper alone is not enough to change long-entrenched judicial 
practice, a lesson that’s already becoming apparent in jurisdictions that are part of the new wave of 
bail reforms. In Chicago, for example, representatives from criminal-justice groups have found that 
judges have not changed their practices to conform to a new cash-bail process implemented this 
summer by the chief judge[.]”); Id. (“From the outset, overworked criminal-defense lawyers lacked 
the time and resources to dig into their clients’ backgrounds and challenge the many bail 
determinations that departed from the law. For prosecutors, the incentives favor the present state of 
affairs: A defendant in jail is far more likely to take a plea deal, giving the government a win, than 
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Distinguishing between defendants based on the nature of the crime 
charged and the individual’s propensity for future dangerousness, whether 
required or permitted, requires right to bail states to grapple with their 
justifications for bail. A misdemeanor/non-violent carve-out makes sense 
if one accepts community safety as a valid purpose of bail because it 
calibrates the stringency of release conditions to the seriousness of the 
conduct alleged and the nature of the risk presented by the individual 
defendant if released. However, embracing, even slightly, a distinction 
between “deserving” and “undeserving” defendants233 conflicts with an 
understanding of bail as an individual protection against arbitrary pretrial 
detention by the state that is available to all noncapital defendants on equal 
terms. Distinctions based on culpability and moral blameworthiness may 
have a legitimate place in sentencing and corrections after a defendant has 
been adjudicated guilty. But in the pretrial context it may be hard to 
reconcile a universal right to bail for noncapital defendants with bail 
practices that extend benefits, such as affording a presumption of release 
on non-financial conditions, to one category of defendants, while denying 
it to others. Further, simply encouraging or requiring trial courts to favor 
take a case to trial. With both sides largely silent, judges, for their part, have had no reason to change 
long-standing practice. There can also be real risks to releasing a defendant . . . ‘Whether directly or 
subliminally,’ said . . . the former chief judge of New York’s highest court . . . ‘the judge doesn’t like 
to see his name on the front page of a tabloid: “Judge releases so-and-so,” and they do some great 
damage to public safety.’”). Cf. Samuel Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 455 
(2016) (identifying “judicial discretion” as a “significant factor” in the pretrial detention crisis and 
observing that “when judges’ discretion is more constrained, it appears more defendants are released 
without a concomitant increase in crime or flight”). See also Walter Olson, Maryland’s Bail Reform 
Is a Warning for Would-Be Moralizers, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 22, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/marylands-bail-reform-is-a-warning-for-would-be-moralizers-
1506119393 [https://perma.cc/PZQ2-7VDW] (Reporting an increase from 7% to 15%. in the share of 
Maryland defendants held without bail from September 2016 to May 2017 and opining that “[i]f bail 
is taken away, judges need other tools to do the same job. Decades ago, when Congress steered the 
federal criminal-justice system away from bail bonds, lawmakers provided practical replacements, 
including systematic help in assessing a defendant’s risk of flight or re-offense, options for pretrial 
supervision, and methods of home and electronic detention. Several states have done the same. New 
Jersey now uses a mathematical algorithm to assess a person’s risk of fleeing or committing another 
crime. But the Maryland legislature, deeply split over Mr. Frosh’s destabilizing changes, has failed to 
set up such alternatives. Maryland’s example doesn’t refute the idea of bail reform. But it does suggest 
state leaders should work to build consensus for comprehensive changes, instead of charging ahead 
with moralizing experiments.”). 
 233.  See Beckett, Reosti, & Knaphus, supra note 201 at 241 (“many reform advocates 
distinguish between deserving [nonviolent offenders, juveniles, the mentally ill, and those convicted 
of drug offenses (especially drug possession)] and undeserving reform recipients and specify that their 
interest in reform extends only to those depicted as comparatively deserving. A somewhat stronger 
version of this narrative asserts that the resources and energies of the criminal justice system, 
including those resources preserved through progressive criminal justice reforms, should be used to 
focus on undeserving offenders.”). 
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release on non-financial conditions for low-level offenses does not 
address one of the most serious criticism of money-based bail 
administration—that a defendant of means charged with a serious, but 
bailable offense can buy his way out of jail, where a defendant who can’t 
afford cash bail and who is denied the bondsman’s services cannot. 
A politically challenging, but high-return strategy to eliminate some 
of the excesses of secured money-bail is to more effectively regulate, or 
even eliminate commercial, for-profit bail bonding. At a minimum, states 
that allow for-profit bail bonding should be actively regulating this 
industry through the criminal justice system, not the insurance 
commissioner. Giving courts direct supervision and disciplinary authority 
over bail bondsman could go a long way towards addressing some of the 
more egregious industry practices. Legislatures can also mandate the use 
of discounted cash bonds, credit bonds, and deposit bonds that are secured 
directly through the court to reduce the influence of commercial interests 
in bail administration. 
Bail administration in the United States is exceedingly jurisdiction-
specific. And those discussing, studying, or litigating contemporary bail 
administration issues need to be able to identify and understand the 
significance of the following aspects of state bail administration. First, 
does the state recognize an absolute constitutional right to bail for 
noncapital offenses? Or, like the federal system and most states today, 
does it permit preventive pretrial detention without bail for some 
noncapital offenses? Second, if the state permits preventive pretrial 
detention without bail, what offenses or circumstances make a defendant 
potentially nonbailable? Is non-bailability based on the type offense 
charged, consideration of the individual defendant’s personal 
characteristics, or a combination of both? Does the state require trial 
courts to use a risk-assessment instrument in pretrial release and detention 
decisions? If so, what are its strengths and weaknesses? Third, does the 
state put money-bail on par with other conditions of release, or is it a 
release condition of last resort? Fourth, does the state permit commercial, 
for-profit bail bonding, and, if so, to what extent does it regulate the bail 
bonding industry? These are critical pieces to the bail reform equation 
because it is not the existence of money-bail that produces the ills bail 
reform seeks to address, it is the heavy reliance on secured money-bail 
resulting in the routine pretrial detention of poor people who pose little 
risk to the community that is the problem. A right to bail jurisdiction that 
affords trial courts wide discretion in imposing money-bail while 
exercising little regulatory control over the commercial bail bond industry 
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creates conditions in which those ills will flourish. And it is those 
jurisdictions that are at most risk of litigation in today’s climate. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The remarkable thing about bail reform in the United States is not 
just the degree of consensus about what is broken and how to fix it, but 
how long the bail reform conversation has gone on. Most of what is 
currently being discussed in bail reform has been said many times before 
over several decades—over 50 years ago Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy offered remarks at the National Bail Conference that are 
indistinguishable from comments being made today about money-bail: 
For 175 years, the right to bail has not been a right to release, it has been 
a right merely to put up money for release, and 1964 can hardly be de-
scribed as the year in which the defects in the bail system were discov-
ered. . . . [O]ur present attitudes toward bail are not only cruel, but really 
completely illogical. . . . [U]sually only one factor determines whether a 
defendant stays in jail before he comes to trial. That factor is not guilty 
or innocence. It is not the nature of the crime. It is not the character of 
the defendant. That factor is, simply, money. How much money does 
the defendant have?234 
The more interesting question today is not the pros and cons of 
secured money-bail, but why a discussion on a topic that policymakers 
and the legal profession agree on has been so prolonged and produced 
such uneven results nationwide. One explanation could be the Supreme 
Court’s lack of engagement in this particular area of criminal procedure. 
Unlike some areas of state criminal procedure that are heavily managed 
by the Supreme Court, state bail law has received relatively little attention 
from the federal courts until recently. The answer must also include 
consideration of the economics of the bail bond industry, judicial 
resources, systemic inertia, political disincentives, and regulatory 
disconnect. 
As one of only two countries that permits the use of commercial bail 
bonds, the United States, collectively speaking, is an outlier. That a 
system tolerates practices disallowed in most of the world, in and of itself, 
is neither a reflection of the entire system, nor an indictment of it. The 
criminal justice system in the United States is not centralized or 
monolithic. Being out of step with other nations sometimes says less about 
 234.  See NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND 
INTERIM REPORT, at 297 (1965).  
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Americans’ collective normative values, than about the nature and process 
of legal reform in a federal system that recognizes states’ superior 
authority and expertise in administering criminal law and procedure. Such 
is the case with bail administration in the United States—it is a patchwork 
of different rules and practices across jurisdictions. 
Secured money-bail is not a standard in American bail 
administration. Nor is it a necessary ingredient in a well-administered 
pretrial system. But money-bail is indispensable in states that recognize 
an absolute right to bail for noncapital offenses because setting unpayable 
bail is the only way to detain dangerous but bailable defendants. Moving 
away from a heavy reliance on money-bail towards preventive pretrial 
detention is the basic blueprint for modern bail reform. But that requires 
universally-available pretrial supervision services, something that may be 
out of reach for rural jurisdictions whose population and judicial resources 
are not as concentrated as they are in urban, or more heavily-populated 
jurisdictions. And it requires giving trial courts the authority to deprive 
individuals of their liberty before any adjudication of guilt in a wide range 
of cases. Abuses of the power to detain based on an accusation alone were 
the inspiration for the original right to bail under English law. And this 
massive power may be one citizens in some states are not disposed to 
entrust to their government lightly. 
Originally grounded in the value of individual liberty, the state right 
to bail has evolved into a money-based bail administration that routinely 
deprives indigent defendants of their pretrial liberty, often with no 
corresponding state interest to justify their detention. Legislatures in right 
to bail states that are unwilling or unable to abrogate the absolute 
constitutional right to bail can no longer ignore the well-documented and 
undeniable problems associated with modern money-based bail 
administration. Jailing large numbers of defendants pretrial who pose no 
public safety risk at taxpayer expense with no commensurate increase in 
safety squanders public resources and fails to protect some of a state’s 
most vulnerable residents and their communities from the financial 
hardships that money-bail visits on them. In today’s bail reform climate, 
unregulated money-based bail administration is a rich target for 
constitutional challenges, challenges that have to be defended at public 
expense. Legislatures in right to bail states that fail to rein in trial courts’ 
discretion to order secured money-bail as a condition of release for low-
risk defendants and that do not effectively regulate the commercial bail 
industry are knowingly perpetuating these problems. In doing so, they 
abdicate both their financial and moral responsibilities to their citizens. 
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